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The goal of this thesis was to decide what environmental variables affected past 
SOF attempts at achieving interoperability with the conventional military, to examine the 
status of SOF and conventional forces interoperability as it exists today, and to explain 
why now is the time for SOF to engage in the reconfiguration of its forces to achieve an 
optimal level of interoperability. 
Five variables were used in the examination of SOPs organizational evolution 
toward interoperability with conventional forces. The interplay of these variables showed 
that environment changes combined with the sponsorship of civilian leadership had a 
dominant, yet, short-lived effect on SOF attempts at achieving interoperability with the 
conventional military, and that the incremental gains in structural and organizational 
aspects of SOF created conditions for achieving interoperability in the future. This 
window of opportunity is temporary, since SOF exists in an environment of competitive 
bureaucracies. Recommendations for SOF leaders in their pursuit of interoperability with 
conventional forces are presented. An opinion on how SOF might reconfigure itself to 
engage interoperability is provided. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Question: Is now the time to reconfigure Special Operations Forces (SOF) for 
the purpose of achieving better interoperability with conventional forces? The Argument: 
Special Operations Forces should engage in organizational reconfiguration, stressing its 
unique qualities, and enhancing its interoperability with the conventional forces. "This 
involves the creation of units that are able to learn--to collect information, and to reflect 
on the consequences of their actions, and to gain insight. It requires units that have the 
ability to act on their learning, either through continuous improvement or through large 
'leaps' of redesign. "1 Reconfiguration is not merely the adjustment of the organizational 
structure, it also includes how an organization interacts internally and externally in 
approaching challenges. 
SOF should use the reconfiguration of its forces as the vehicle for achieving 
interoperability with the conventional forces. The enhancement of the interoperability 
between conventional forces and SOF will greatly contribute to the national military 
strategy. Throughout the spectrum of conflict, SOF and conventional forces have roles 
and missions that can complement each other. In the field of operations other than war, 
SOF and conventional forces should operate as one composite unit--a truly joint force. 
The evolution of Special Operations Forces efforts to achieve interoperability with 
the conventional military is the subject examined in this thesis. First, I examine the 
evolutionary process of SOF and conventional military interoperability. I highlight the 
dominant variables essential for achieving the optimal level of interoperability. Four 
historical cases were dissected and examined using five environmental variables. I 
examine a set of variables that have traditionally influenced SOF efforts toward 
interoperability within the United States military's paradigm of war. The variables are: 
environment changes, technology changes, organization growth, political leadership, and 
1 David A. Nadler, Maarc S. Gerstein, Robert B. Shaw, Organizational 
Architecture, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1992, pp. 122-123. 
1 
military leadership changes. Second, I examine how the present arrangement of the 
variables favor SOF reconfiguration to enhance interoperability. Third, I form conclusions 
and offer recommendations for SOF leadership on interoperability with the conventional 
forces. 
Achieving interoperability between SOF and the conventional force is the 
underpinning of SOFas an effective contributor to national security efforts. The precursor 
to discussing a reconfiguration of SOF is understanding the evolutionary process of SOFs 
major attempts at gaining interoperability within the military's paradigm of war. SOFs 
quest for interoperability with conventional forces is not a singular event; it is an 
evolutionary process. Organizations desire a degree of interoperability that allows a 
seamless coordination of effort and yet also allow considerable autonomy at the operational 
level. 
Imagine SOF and the conventional force as a combination computer graphics and 
word processing program. The word processing program is an efficient collector and 
organizer of text (conventional force). The graphics program (SOF) produces slides that 
get the attention of the target audience. By combining these unique capabilities, one 
produces a synergistic effect in a briefing. For this interoperability to succeed, the 
graphics program must be compatible with the operating system of the computer (conform 
to general organizational conventions). The program must be user friendly (interoperable). 
It must also be able to translate the main ideas to be briefed into clear expressions 
(contribute to mission success), or it will be deleted from the computer (conventional 
bureaucracy). This is a simple evolutionary process that is complicated, in reality, by a 
multitude of strong variables, particularly the aspect of conforming to the host 
organizational conventions. 
Since World War II and until the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, as amended 
by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Special Operations Forces were not 
resourced or structured to engage the environment they operated in. SOF must chart a 
course that is buttressed by its unique capabilities and interoperability with the 
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conventional force. SOF must remain operationally different, mastering those skills not 
trained on by general purpose forces. At the same time SOF must remain organizationally 
and psychologically interoperable with the conventional forces complementing each others 
efforts not complicating them. 
Why is the conventional military restructuring? It is restructuring because the gap 
between the conventional military paradigm and emerging military requirements have 
widened. Restructuring has been a typically uncomfortable remedy for organizations that 
recognize environmental change and seek to close the performance gap between 
environmental requirements and the organization's capacity to engage the new 
requirements. 
The framing of the argument is covered in the introduction. Chapter one describes 
the theoretical framework of variables influencing reconfiguration and their effects on the 
dependent variable, and SOF interoperability within the military. The framework helps 
draw conclusions about the variables affecting SOFs attempts at interoperability within the 
military. The four cases are examined using the five factors that usually effect 
organizational reconfiguration: environmental changes, technology changes, organization 
growth, political leadership, and military leadership changes. 
The evolution of SOFs attempt to achieve interoperability is covered by Chapters 
II, III, IV, V, and VI. Chapter II provides the theoretical framework for this study. 
Chapter III will apply the theoretical framework to the first of four cases: the formation 
and demise of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the second world war. In 
Chapter IV, the theoretical framework is applied to the second of four cases: SOP and the 
Kennedy initiative. In Chapter V, the theoretical framework was applied to the third of 
four cases: Survival without a political guardian. In Chapter VI, the theoretical 
framework is applied to the last of the four cases: Operation Desert One--A new lease for 
SOF. 
Chapter VII draws conclusions from the four cases to examine the evolution of 
SOFs attempts at interoperability. The period examined begins with World War II and 
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ends in the late 1980s. Using the conclusions from Chapter VII, the following argument 
is examined: Now is the time for the reconfiguration of SOF, a fleeting window of 
opportunity is open. The dominant variables that act as drivers for SOF /conventional 
integration and SOFs reconfiguration, are today more amenable to such change. Some 
of the factors are supportive of SOF and some are less supportive. Chapter VIII lists 
recommendations for SOF leadership to follow in their efforts toward interoperability with 
the conventional force. The appendix provides an opinion on how SOF might reconfigure. 
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IT. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework used to examine the predominant variables influencing 
organizational reconfiguration was derived from organizational studies literature. Five 
variables were used to narrow the broad spectrum of "change" and their affect on the 
military as an organization. These variables assist in the dissection of the cases in 
determining which variables were most influential to interoperability. "Sometimes several 
of these variables converged at the same time"; thus, the interplay of the variables 
resembled a combination lock. As the environmental variables changed, so did the 
combination for achieving SOF and conventional forces interoperability. 
B. THE CASES 
• The formation and demise of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
• Kennedy's initiatives for a flexible response capability with SOF as the 
centerpiece. 
• Survival without a political guardian. Even a military defeat fails to cause a 
paradigm shift among the conventional military bureaucracy. 
• Operation Desert One, a failure of interoperability, Special Operations Forces 
are given a new organizational lease with which to grow and restructure. 
Each of the four cases were examined in accordance with the changes that lead to 
reconfiguration, including the following variables: 
• Environment Changes. What was the geopolitical environment during each 
case? How did this environment effect the military with respect to SOF 
interoperability with conventional forces? 
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• Technology Changes. What was the general focus of technology during the 
case? How did technology effect SOF interoperability with conventional forces? 
• Organization Growth. What was the structural growth or decline of the SOF 
and the conventional force organization during the case? What effect did this 
have on the SOF organization Is interoperability with conventional forces? 
• Political Leadership. What was the external civilian leadership and the political 
climate? How did the political leadership effect SOF interoperability with 
conventional forces? 
• Military Leadership. What were the conventional force and SOF leaders I 
impact on interoperability between SOF and the conventional forces? 
6 
ID. CASE ONE: THE FORMATION AND DEMISE OF THE OFFICE OF 
STRATEGIC SERVICES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The case of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is the first significant attempt 
at achieving interoperability between SOF and the American conventional military. From 
June 1941 through October 1945, the OSS conducted guerrilla and unconventional warfare 
in support of the conventional force's strategic objectives. On the eve of World War II, 
the Army had no special operations capabilities for unconventional warfare, guerrilla 
warfare, counterinsurgency, strike operations, psychological operations, or civil affairs. 
In June 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Coordinator of Information 
(COl). The COl charter included the waging of psychological warfare and the gathering 
and analysis of information. President Roosevelt also persuaded Wall Street republican 
lawyer, World War I Medal of Honor winner and political power from New York City, 
William "Wild Bill" Donovan to create a unified intelligence gathering organization. On 
11 July 1941, Donovan was appointed by Roosevelt as Coordinator of Information (COI). 2 
As Coordinator of Information, Mr. William Donovan was convinced that guerrilla 
warfare could cripple a modern nation's ability to wage war. In July 1941, the Office of 
Strategic Services was established under BG William Donovan. The OSS undertook a 
variety of unconventional warfare missions throughout World War II. Of note were the 
Jedburgh teams which aided the French resistance in support of D-Day operations. The 
Operational Groups' (OG) 356 U.S. Army-French speaking volunteers parachuted in after 
D-Day and assisted with the coordination of guerrilla activities. In August 1944, the 
Operational Groups were expanded and placed under the 2671st Special Reconnaissance 
Battalion, Separate (Provisional). By spring of 1945, over 75 OG teams assisted French 
2 United States Army Special Operations Command, Directorate of History and 
Museums, To Free From Oppression, 1994, pp. 21-22. 
7 
partisans in blocking the retreat of the Germans. OGs fought in Italy and throughout the 
Mediterranean. OSS-led partisans took the islands of Sardinia and Corsica. OG-teams 
operated inside German-occupied Greece, assisting partisans in unconventional warfare 
against the Germans. General Douglas MacArthur, having barred the OSS from operating 
in his Southwest Pacific jurisdiction, did not stop the OSS from successfully operating in 
other theaters such as Burma. Detachment 101 operations in northern Burma proved to 
be both operationally profitable and challenging. Three hundred Americans and 3,200 
Burmese tribesmen harassed Japanese occupation forces by blowing up bridges, supply 
dumps, ambushing convoys and capturing prisoners. Detachment 101 and the "Kachin 
Rangers" were instrumental in the clearing of the Burma road to China, against a superior 
Japanese occupation force. Other operations can be credited to the OSS in China, 
Thailand, Indochina, Indonesia, and Malaya. The OSS also established the U.S. Army 
Civil Affairs Division in 1943. Overall, the OSS distinguished itself in the missions it was 
permitted to conduct. 
In this case we see several interesting conclusions. First, the conceptual lenses 
used by civilian and military leadership formed different views of what all the 
requirements needed to be in war. Demonstrating that one organization's environment 
assessment does not always lead to clear requirements, the requirements were manipulated 
by organizations and their respective leaders. The geopolitical environment for the United 
States of America saw its politically uncomfortable emergence from the isolationism of the 
1930s into a position of global military and economic dominance in the 1940s. Roosevelt 
wanted intelligence to be useful to his strategic decision making. One implication of this 
request was that the gathering of this intelligence would be integrated with the military. 
Unfortunately for the OSS, the priority and the execution of this request was subject to 
different assessments between civilian and conventional military leaders. Second, the 
technological focus of the day was geared toward the conventional paradigm of 
warfighting, not unconventional warfare. In 1939, "The central focus of the American 
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war paradigm was on production. "3 The prevailing logic was: winning big wars requires 
mass production, not Special Operations. The effects of technology on OSS 
interoperability were neutral due to the conceptual view of war by the conventional 
leadership. The proponents of unconventional warfare did not require high end 
technology. The OSS paradigm of war was low production, no mass, high quality, and 
socially and politically astute forces. Hence, technology was of little impact. Third, the 
external efforts of civilian leadership to prod the military bureaucracy into shifting its 
paradigm of warfighting toward SOP and conventional force interoperability were 
ineffective. 
B. ENVIRONMENT CHANGES 
Unlike a statistical assessment which has rules for producing findings, 
assessments of environmental realities have no standard set of rules in determining the 
requirements for dealing with an environment. The civilian assessment of the geopolitical 
environment favored political strategies, while conventional military leaders assessment 
tended, expectedly, to favor military solutions. The environment in which the OSS existed 
had three distinct phases: the pre-war, wartime, and post-war geopolitical environments. 
No matter what the environment, the fate of the OSS was always determined by how either 
civilian or military leadership chose to view OSS utility, not necessarily how well they 
functioned within the environment. 
The pre-war environment saw the United States trying to prepare for its 
unavoidable entry into the war. The formation of the Office of Strategic Services was a 
result of President Roosevelt's desire for a unified intelligence gathering organization that 
was not provided by the existing military. The military leadership and the civilian 
leadership viewed the changes in the environment through different conceptual viewpoints. 
3 Guilmartin, John F., Jr., Technology and Strategy· What are the Limits? 
Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, 20 July 1994. 
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The OSS was supported by civilian leadership and their assessment of the changes in the 
environment. However, the conventional military leadership was opposed to the OSS 
being integrated into the military. Like any organization the conventional military 
leadership's view of the OSS was as tainted by organizational bias, as was the OSS view 
of the conventional military. The philosophy of the OSS was not within the teachings of 
the conventional paradigm of war. For this reason many leaders and soldiers were 
resistant to a brand of warfare they were not trained to understand. Second, the OSS was 
an organization of war with a direct line of communication to the president outside the 
military's bureaucracy. This was a thorn in the side of the conventional military leaders. 
The wartime environment created the strategic space for the operational 
employment of the OSS. A condition of slack resources existed, opening a niche in the 
spectrum of warfighting that was neither a threat to conventional force priority efforts or 
their resources. From July 1943 through October 1945, the OSS was permitted to operate 
on the margins of the war. 
The post-war geopolitical environment generally viewed all forces, both 
conventional and unconventional, as machines no longer required to operate at full 
capacity in the production of U.S. global power. This, in concert with the arrival of the 
atomic paradigm of war, made conventional war fighting irrelevant in the popular 
American paradigm of war. At the end of the war, the military's conventional mindset 
had to defend itself from other assaults on its paradigm. The most persistent assault was 
the formulation of a strategic Nuclear Policy imposed on the military institution. 
Speculation at the time was that atomic weapons would keep the peace, thus large 
conventional conflicts between industrial nations less likely to occur. Unconventional 
warfare was of minor significance in comparison to the decisive impact of the conventional 
paradigm of war or the promises of a nuclear deterrence strategy. The sustainment of the 
OSS was seen as a waste of resources by conventional leaders who were trying to 
determine the requirements of a nuclear battlefield. 
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The conclusion about the effect of environment change on interoperability is that 
it was not a dominant influencing factor. The environment was subject to varied 
assessments of what the requirements should be, depending on the agenda of the 
organization making the assessment. 
C. TECHNOLOGY CHANGES 
Technology was of minor influence on OSS interoperability with the conventional 
force. The type of technologies being exploited for war were mainly those dealing with 
the mass production of items that enhanced firepower and mobility. These principles of 
war were not usually as important to the OSS as, say, cross-cultural skills and 
psychological warfare. Donovan's message called for minimizing the massing of troops 
and maximizing economy of force missions. Thus, technology-based mass production to 
facilitate conventional force on force operations were not needed. This is evident when 
we compare the techniques of day and night allied bombing against German railroads to 
the operations of partisan sabotage of German rail lines and engines. The allied bombing 
campaigns against German lines of communication were a showcase for high-end 
technology and mass production combined to produce thousands of aircraft and their 
supporting systems. The partisans and resistance, on the other hand, used low technology 
techniques, e.g., camouflaged explosives as chunks of coal thrown into railroad engines 
by their unsuspecting crews. The preceding examples represent the difference between 
conventional force use of high technology and OSS ability to operate without it. OSS 
would find little to no support from defense production institutions since they would not 
be requesting defense contracts involving mass production, as did the conventional forces. 
The technological focus was on the production of aircraft, tanks, and ship items that 
enhanced allied abilities to move, shoot and communicate. The OSS could operate with 
the existing technologies provided by the conventional force; no substantial change in 
technology was needed. The OSS depended upon human factors for mission success, 
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gaining rapport with indigenous peoples, and cross-cultural skills often dominated a 
Jedburgh teams formula for operational success. 
After the war, the American paradigm of war was validated. The combination of 
firepower and mass production was concluded to be the way to win wars, period. The 
creation after World War II and continued existence of the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces provide eloquent testimony to that emphasis, an emphasis that is deeply imbedded 
in the U.S. military services' corporate memories and thought processes. John Patrick has 
neatly encapsulated that reality in his perceptive description of the U.S. Army, Navy, and 
Air Force as "classic industrial institutions. "4 
"The fundamental underpinnings of the paradigm, however, were shaken by the 
advent of the nuclear age. After a brief period of unexploited monopoly, nuclear 
proliferation set in. The United States and its allies faced the reality of the Cold War. 
They also faced a situation in which their industrial bases were secure from direct attack, 
save by massive nuclear strike which would surely have been answered in kind. "5 
The relationship between technology and SOF achieving interoperability with the 
conventional military was not a strong one. The OSS could function without nuclear 
technology, mass production, and technologies that enhanced firepower and maneuver 
warfare. For this reason technological changes were not a dominant factor in this case. 
D. ORGANIZATION GROWTH 
The relationship between organizational growth and OSS-conventional force 
interoperability was not substantial. The OSS organization existed only as long as the 
short-lived support of its political sponsor. In pre-war 1940 with no great wars to fight, 
the standing military bureaucracy turned its focus inward to fight the parochial war for 
4 Howard, Sir Michael and John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Two Historians In Technology 
and War, Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph. 
5 Ibid., p. 22. 
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resources. The effect on OSS interoperability was that the prewar military bureaucracy 
saw itself becoming vulnerable to the OSS as a bureaucratic competitor. The internal 
military organizational climate in the prewar military provided the catalyst for change. 
Thus, the staff set out to disembowel the OSS as a bureaucratic competitor in the American 
paradigm of war. "In the ensuing months the Army, the Navy and the State Department, 
far more familiar with the maze and manipulation of Washington's bureaucracy, siphoned 
off many of the COl's original functions. Indeed, some Washington observers at the time 
wondered if the fledgling COl itself were doomed. "6 What saved Donovan's OSS? The 
dominant reason was disinterest on the part of the military in a minor bureaucratic battle. 
Since, the Japanese had just attacked Pearl Harbor, there where now more pressing 
problems for the conventional military. After the war started, Donovan seized the 
opportunity for organizational growth by seeking the external support of the President. 
Donovan's request for resources at a time when military institutions had bigger problems 
enabled the OSS to get started. "Finally, in June 1942, the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), directly responsible to the war department but stripped of most of its psychological 
warfare responsibilities, emerged from the bureaucratic wars. "7 The OSS operated in an 
diminished form, with considerable positive effects and few failures. The civilian 
leadership could demand that the OSS be established, but the military in the long run, 
showed that it would determine the fate of military matters. With the end of the war 
came the resurgence of conventional military parochialism, and the disbanding of the OSS. 
The OSS had its operational successes, enough to bolster the arguments of it 
supporters to push for an institutionalized unconventional warfare capability within the 
U.S. military. For most World War II leaders, both military and civilian, the efforts of 
specialized units were viewed as marginal at best in the grand scheme of war. The other 
6 Ibid. 
7 United States Army Special Operations Command, Directorate of History and 
Museums, To Free From Oppression, 1994. 
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part of the problem was the growth of an organization that was networked directly to the 
President outside military bureaucratic control. In the conventional military leaders' 
opinion creating an organization that increased the civilian leadership's capability to 
"mettle in military matters," was a mistake. The structural growth of the OSS can be 
partly described by the organizational theory phenomenon of "slack resources," the 
availability of unused resources. This was due to the rapid growth of the military as it 
prepared for war. As stated by Colonel Aaron Bank: "I had noted that often logistic and 
air support for OSS had not been given a high level of priority by the military. Rather its 
priority was on the low end of the scale. If there were an abundance of what had been 
requested or requisitioned on hand OSS got a break otherwise It didn't. "8 
In the end, the military saw fit to disband OSS operation in October of 1945. Its 
organizational existence, successes, and growth were not influential enough to aid in 
interoperability within the military. In the words of Colonel (Ret.) Aaron Bank: "What 
concerned me was whether or not the vacuum left by blindly dismantling an organization 
that had proved itself so indispensable as an essential component of total warfare would 
be properly filled. I was convinced that there was a requirement for an organization such 
as OSS preferably within the military-the Army. "9 There were persons who agreed with 
Colonel Bank, but most of these people were not in the Army's leadership. The OSS was 
reestablished outside the military in 1947; it would be called the Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
8 Bank, Aaron, From OSS to Green Berets· The Birth of Special Forces, Presidio 
Press, CA. 
9 Ibid., p.130. 
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E. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
Political leadership and its relationship with military leadership were the dominant 
variables in the fate of OSS and conventional force interoperability. The external civilian 
political leadership saw a different set of political-military requirements in comparison 
with the military. Roosevelt's administration, like others, was not always satisfied with 
the military establishment's apparent lack of responsiveness to an administration's political 
requirements in war. All good commanders understand that political and military affairs 
are inexorably connected; but like all professional persons, military leaders are cautious 
of guidance from outside agencies. In response to this dilemma, Roosevelt sought 
solutions from William Donovan, someone more sensitive to both the political and military 
side of strategy. Roosevelt's appointment of William Donovan to lead this unconventional 
organization was a good one. In the end, however, it was not an influential variable for 
interoperability. To expect Donovan to triumph against the current of conventional 
warfare was tantamount to having him swim across the Atlantic Ocean. 
Most democratic leaders base their successes in their ability to reach a compromise 
on most issues. While the military leaderships' tendency has been one of staying on 
course, to compromise might be seen as less than victory. Military men have been 
historically judged on their ability to achieve victory, usually after the failure of some sort 
of political compromise. The political leader tends to shift his emphasis on issues in 
accordance to the rate of changes in the geopolitical environment. Military leadership 
wants precision gained through routinization, thus facilitating the management of large 
military organizations during the confusion of warfare. 
The differing mindsets of Roosevelt and the conventional military caused a self-
fulfilling prophecy of failure for OSS and conventional force interoperability. Roosevelt 
wanted an OSS capability. Since he thought it must logically be military in nature, he 
directed its establishment. He also established a revolution from above. Military leaders 
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had their paradigm for war and did not appreciate the forced incorporation of an 
organization that did not fit their model for war. 
Initially the OSS received civilian support. This support, however, faded as other 
major issues emerged, taking the civilian sponsors attention from the OSS. For an 
American president to go to war and not let the military make military decisions was often 
viewed as imprudent. First, Roosevelt was not a military professional or expert. Second, 
it is not politically wise for politicians to set themselves up for all the blame should 
military options fail. Support from the political leadership was a short-run benefit for the 
OSS. The fact that it was externally imposed sowed the seeds for long term military 
resentment. 
F. MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
Military leadership was the dominant variable in the case of the OSS and its 
attempts for interoperability with the conventional force during the war. From the 
assessment of the conventional military leadership, the war was to be won by conventional 
force-on-force operations. For conventional forces the subject of unconventional warfare 
was not part of their education, training, technological focus, or mythos. There were, in 
fact, good reasons in 1940 for military leaders to be unimpressed by the forced inclusion 
of the OSS. The conventional military leaders, such as General MacArthur in one theater 
and Lieutenant General Patton in the other, were unanimous in their disapproval of the 
OSS. Lieutenant General Patton once commented after an encounter with Donovan that 
"I really do like and respect Donovan. His men have conducted some courageous 
missions. However, the OSS for the most part are of little impact to the final outcome of 
the War." 
At the end of the war, it was easy for the conventional military leadership to assess 
that the OSS helped at the margins. It did not achieve the final victory in the manner that 
the conventional forces had. Given the assumptions of the post-World War II period, the 
military leadership was correct in viewing the OSS as not worthy of integration into the 
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military. The conventional military faced downsizing and an uncomfortable transition to 
atomic warfare, making unconventional warfare seemed like a frivolous issue. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The dominant variable in this case was military leadership. It was the conventional 
military leaderships I disagreement with the politicalleaderships I directives that determined 
the fate of the OSSis hope for interoperability with the conventional forces. The variable 
of military leadership proved more resilient than the influence of the variable of political 
leadership. 
The effect of environment change on interoperability was not a dominant factor 
influencing interoperability. The environment was subject to varied assessments of what 
the requirements should be depending on the agenda of the organization making the 
assessment. 
The relationship between technology and SOF achieving interoperability with the 
conventional military was not a strong one. The OSS could function without nuclear 
technology, mass production, and technologies that enhanced firepower and maneuvered 
warfare. For this reason technological changes were not a dominant factor in this case. 
The relationship between organizational growth and OSS and conventional force 
interoperability was not substantial. The OSS organization existed only as long as the 
short lived support of its political sponsor. Support from the political leadership was a 
short-run benefit for the OSS. The fact that it was externally imposed sowed the seeds of 
long-term military resentment. Military leadership was the dominant variable in the case 
of the OSS in its attempt for interoperability with the conventional force during the war. 
The result was that forced integration by military outsiders failed to induce integration or 
the sustainment of SOF and conventional force interoperability. 
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IV. CASE TWO: SOF AND THE KENNEDY INITIATIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This case represents the second significant attempt at SOF and Conventional Force 
interoperability. It also represents the second significant sponsorship of SOF and 
conventional force interoperability by a political leader. President John F. Kennedy's 
influence in this case spans from 1960 through 1963. This case illustrates that achieving 
interoperability between SOF and the conventional force will be a matter of winning by 
increments, since both the SOF and conventional viewpoints perceive the changes as 
beneficial. An evolutionary process of integration leading to interoperability rather than 
politically sponsored revolution from above seems to be the path for SOF. The Kennedy 
administration faced a problem similar to that faced by the Roosevelt administration--a 
military bureaucracy that did not want to change according to the civilian leaderships view 
of the national military requirements. 
A solid bipolar geopolitical system was firmly established by the time Kennedy 
took control of the Presidency. With the advent of a nuclear stalemate between the Soviets 
and the U.S., other strategies for achieving international dominance were developed. The 
Americans sought to use capitalism as the vehicle for achieving world dominance. The 
Soviets countered with an international campaign of wars of national liberation and 
targeted countries on the perimeters of western influence. This situation negated the policy 
of mutually assured destruction and gave birth to the idea of a flexible response to 
international and regional threats. 
In 1960, the proponents for SOF received new life under the auspices of Kennedy 
and his need for politically soluble solutions to military confrontation in a bipolar world, 
a world in which a balance of power existed due to nuclear parity between the two 
hegemons. The worst case scenario of nuclear war was a warm bedfellow for the military 
organization's tendency to resist change. "Nuclear weapons technology has proven to be 
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remarkably resistant to innovation. The advantage still clearly lies with military forces 
oriented neither to disarming nor denial operations, but to punishment. "10 The Soviet 
Union created a significant environmental change with a strategy designed to dilute the 
nuclear technological edge of its enemies. The Soviets embarked on a strategy involving 
wars of national liberation at the margins of their opponents' areas of influence, usually 
in the non-aligned nation-states. 
Kennedy wanted his perception of a flexible response capability instituted in the 
military to counter Soviet sponsored wars. On the other hand, the conventional military 
leadership viewed conflicts like Vietnam as a sideshow in comparison to preparations for 
the Soviet threat in Europe. Like the OSS case study, civilian leadership would not force 
a substantial degree of SOF interoperability with the conventional forces. The variable of 
technology, as well, will not influence SOF and conventional force interoperability as 
profoundly as it will the conventional forces ability to enhance firepower and mobility. 
This case does show the raw building blocks being laid for future interoperability. Small 
incremental gains would be made in the sustainment of SOF structure even after Kennedy 
was gone. 
Nuclear age pentamic divisions and the flexible response Reorganization of Army 
Divisions (ROAD) were the competing Army force structures of the 1950s and 1960s. In 
comparison the structural growth of SOF was an exercise in window dressing. The Army 
leadership was at best insulted by the directive to establish units tailored to meet the 
president's requirement for a flexible response capability. The creation of such units 
meant the disbanding of other units, units that fit the paradigm, agenda, or assessments of 
the conventional military. 
Due to President John Kennedy's personal affinity for Special Forces "it was a 
foregone conclusion that the Army would seek to give the president what he wanted: a 
counterinsurgency force structure based on the Special Forces. This is not to say that the 
10 Posen, Barry R., The Sources of Military Doctrine· France Britain and Germany 
Between the World Wars, Cornell University Press, London, 1984. 
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brass was enthusiastic about developing such a capability--they were not. Rather, it was 
a case of the Army satisfying a requirement using the 'parts on hand' in such a way as to 
disrupt as little as possible the essence of the organization: the heavy (armor and 
mechanized infantry) division. "11 Thus, the reconfiguration of SOF was presented: 
In a speech at the Army War College on 8 June 1961 General 
Decker outlined the concept around which these four Special Forces Groups 
(1st SFG Southeast Asia, 5th SFG Africa, 7th SFG Latin America, and 
lOth SFG Middle East) would operate. They would form the core elements 
of U.S. free world liaison and assistance groups, or FLAGs. Each FLAG 
would include an SFG, a psychological warfare battalion, and civil affairs, 
engineer, signal, military intelligence, and medical detachments. FLAGs 
would be deployed at the direction of the president to assist friendly 
governments threatened with Communist- inspired insurgencies. Once 
deployed they would by responsible to the U.S. ambassador through his 
senior military advisor (presumably the MAAG chief). In the Army study 
outlining the FLAG concept an annex focusing on a "mini-FLAG" for 
Vietnam recommended that if the GVN requested military assistance, a 
311-man force should be dispatched immediately. The mini-FLAG would 
contain personnel from all the components of the projected FLAG but at 
reduced levels. The Army also set about drawing plans for sending FLAGs 
to Columbia and Nicaragua. 12 
On 17 August, the President signed the DoD Appropriations Act for 1962 for an 
additional 3,000 spaces for Army counterinsurgency forces. From the army staff's point 
of view, everything appeared to be right on track; however, the formation of FLAGs as 
the Army's force structure for counterinsurgency contingencies was not to beY The 
United States geopolitical involvement in Vietnam both militarily and politically can be 
characterized by the phrase: "Since we did not know what to do we did what we knew." 
11 Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr., The Army in Vietnam, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 
1986, p. 103. 
12 Ibid., p. 104. 
13 Ibid., p. 105. 
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Dr. Larry Cable, in his book Conflict of Myths, summarizes the prosecution of this 
conflict as a product of past military experiences interpreted through a particular 
intellectual lens that created a seemingly logical path toward the miscalculation of the 
events in southeast Asia during the 1950s and 1960s. The military leadership maintained 
their belief in the strategy that the enemy would soon fight the conventional conflict that 
the United States military was hoping for. SOF was a secondary effort that was 
increasingly made to conduct missions that supported the conventional operations, such as 
reconnaissance and direct actions, over their intended counterinsurgency role. Operations 
that attacked the infrastructure of the insurgency, such as the Phoenix Project, were 
misunderstood and under-resourced. The SOF role during the early 1960s as advisors and 
unconventional warriors shifted by the 1970s to that of a Commando- or Ranger-like 
role. 14 Again this case supports the theory that interoperability between SOF and the 
conventional force will only work as an evolution from within the military, not as a 
revolution from above. 
B. ENVIRONMENT CHANGES 
As in the case of the OSS, the variable of the environment was manipulated by the 
biased assessments of both the dominant variable of military conventional leaders and 
political leadership. The effect of the environment on the promotion of SOF 
interoperability in theory was supportive and promising. But in an environment dominated 
by a highly competitive conventional military bureaucracy, many promises of SOF 
integration with the conventional forces were not honored. Incremental gains beyond those 
of the OSS case were realized, due in part, to the fact that the nuclear deterrent proved not 
to be the solution for all geopolitical conflicts. In addition, conventional leaders 
recognized that SOF capabilities had at least a degree of usefulness in addressing those 
problems viewed as existing outside the responsibility of the conventional forces. 
14 Ibid. 
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C. TECHNOLOGY CHANGES 
The effect of technology on SOF and conventional force interoperability was 
moderate at best. SOF operations in Vietnam for the most part used existing conventional 
force technologies but nothing that was closely linked to enhancing SOF and conventional 
force interoperability. SOF did seek to emulate and blend in with the conventional 
technological band wagon in an effort to prove itself worthy of organizational survival by 
the conventional force. An example of this would be the insertion of nuclear warheads 
against communist block targets by Special Forces teams. 
The general state and focus of technology was marked by the United States military 
becoming entranced with the ideal of new technologies as more than just enhancers but as 
veritable solutions to military problems. "In this century, as the United States has had a 
resource advantage over each of her adversaries, firepower and technology have evolved 
as substitutes for precious manpower. Indeed, the Army even has a statement for it: 'It 
is better to send a bullet than a man.'" The transition considered most important by the 
military leaders was from pentomic to ROAD ground forces geared to the worst case 
nuclear battlefield. Long-run technology defense programs and the prevailing conventional 
mindset was facing pressure from the administration to incorporate the capability of 
flexible response to regional contingencies. The friction occurred due to the Army's 
bureaucracy thriving on the production of long-run technologically-based procurement 
programs. They wanted heavy divisions with high mobility and firepower potential. The 
military leadership believed that the problem of engagement of small wars and wars of 
liberation was well within the capabilities of a force constructed to win the "big one." The 
conventional paradigm of firepower and mass production was accepted by conventional 
wisdom as being validated by World War II. Besides, the defense industry, another 
organization resistant to change, was both entrenched and profitable within the military 
and political decision making circles. During this period even conventional proponents for 
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new technologies like the helicopter were heavily resisted because airmobile divisions 
would cut into the funding for armored divisions. 
The effect of technology on SOF interoperability was not overwhelming. SOF 
forces simply did not require the American focus of technology like the conventional 
forces did. 
D. ORGANIZATION GROWTH 
The effect of organizational growth on SOF and conventional force interoperability 
was dominated by its relationship to the variables of political and military leadership. In 
this case the variable, political leadership, indirectly resulted in SOF organizations not 
being completely disbanded by the dominance and endurance of the conventional military 
leadership. Presidential directive dictated the growth of counterinsurgency forces causing 
the military leadership to be involved in how the force would be formed. The Army 
viewed this as a resource allocation problem: how much would they be forced to divert 
from their preferred contingency of a war in Europe. The Army leadership was faced with 
more than a straight-forward development of a counterinsurgency capability within the 
Army. The FLAG concept of U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Decker, was authorized 
by the Department of Defense in 1962. The original concepts of counterinsurgency and 
SOF-like growth degraded as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Projected Increases in Special Forces from April 1961 to June 1962 
Current Projected 
Unit Strength Strength Orientation 
1st SFG 364 1,262 Southeast Asia 
5th SFG 0 1,262 Africa 
7th SFG 0 1,262 Latin America 
lOth SFG 364 1,262 Middle East 15 
Two months later a report by General Stilwell questioned the workability of the 
FLAG concept, citing a variety of organizational problems. In its footsteps came the 
Howze Board directed by LTG Hamilton H. Howze, see Table 2. It evaluated the Stilwell 
Report and came up with its answer to counterinsurgency, Special Warfare and 
interoperability. 
15 Ibid, p. 105. 
25 













The Army, having failed to localize force structure development for 
counterinsurgency within the special warfare units, was now faced with 
some very unwelcome recommendations and suggestions from the Howze 
Board. The diversion of over three divisions to the counterinsurgency 
mission was not what Decker and the DCSOPS had in mind when they 
drew up the FLAG proposal. The Army Staff was particularly irked by the 
board's thinly veiled attempt to call for the development of three airmobile 
divisions to meet the threat, since the board's chairman, Lt. Gen. Howze, 
was a prime mover in a group of high-ranking officers calling for the 
formation of air assault divisions for conventional warfare. 17 
By 1965, the actual growth of Special Forces and SOF-like organizations was 
comprised of seven SFGs, backed up by five infantry brigades with little 
counterinsurgency training. The post-war saw massive troop reductions and a transition 
to a Volunteer Army. The SOF community saw the deactivation of four Special Forces 
16 Ibid., p. 109. 
17 Ibid., p. 109. 
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Groups and the consolidation of Special Warfare, Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPS) schools. 
In the end, the effect of organizational growth permitted SOF to operate only as 
sideshow to the true priorities of the conventional force leadership. SOF survival of 
post-war reductions was also a demonstration of conventional force determination to show 
that they had still "checked the box" for the counterinsurgency requirement. The SOF 
sponsorship by Kennedy never resulted in an organization capable of conducting his 
concept of a flexible politically-attuned military response. The organizational growth or 
decline of the conventional force and SOF had little positive effect on interoperability. 
E. POLITICAL LEADERSIDP 
Civilian leaders do affect military doctrine. Their intervention is often responsible 
for the level of innovation and integration achieved in a given military doctrine. 
Leadership was the dominant variable, when compared to the influence of environment 
changes and national requirements. It took the outside influence of the civilian leadership 
to enact even limited change in the powerful military bureaucracy. Kennedy and his 
proponents in support of SOF were not entirely comfortable with the dilemma of following 
military advice when it came to situations involving the use of coercive force or following 
a purely diplomatic course of action. In support of bureaucratic parochialism and in light 
of the Kennedy counterinsurgency/SOP initiative, the military leadership at large 
represented a closing of the ranks. Among the Army leadership, "it was felt that the 
reorganization from Pentomic Divisions into the ROAD structure would permit standard 
units 'to meet the needs of the many variables of limited war.'" Thus the ROAD division, 
through use of its brigades, would provide the nucleus for upgrading what had been the 
FLAG. 18 
18 Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr., The Army in Vietnam, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 
1986, p. 107. 
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The overall effect of political leadership on interoperability was a predictable 
moderate effectiveness in the short run. The divergence from case one was its long-run 
marginal effectiveness in SOF organizational persistence. 
F. MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
The effect of military leadership on the interoperability of SOF with the 
conventional forces was the dominant variable in preventing long run interoperability. 
The mindset of the military leaders was that they would be ultimately judged by their 
ability to win in the advent of total war. The popular assessment was that a nuclear 
conflict against the Soviet block forces was the most probable and most deadly contingency 
in the 1960s and 1970s. With this focus influencing all strategic considerations, it is 
understandable that conventional military leaders would dismiss the importance of 
counterinsurgency or special operations. The key feature of the political climate within 
the Army was the lack of change. Not unreasonably, military leaders tend to need 
undeniable evidence, such as a substantial defeat or victory, before engaging in doctrinal 
change. To the conventional leaders the conventional paradigm of war was validated by 
World War II. The doctrine for the nuclear battlefield had yet to be tested. Small wars 
like Vietnam simply fell under the conventional paradigm of war. Despite the warnings 
from the field and lower echelon political leaders, the American military closed ranks in 
support of the pre-Vietnam paradigm of war. 
Thus, in Vietnam the Army ended up trying to fight the kind of 
conventional war that it was trained, organized, and prepared (and that it 
wanted) to fight instead of the counterinsurgency was it was sent to fight. 
By focusing on perceived civilian shortcomings to the exclusion of a hard 
look at its own failures in the war, the Army is perpetuating the fiction that 
its concept of war remains valid in all conflict environments and that the 
problem in future FID conflicts will come from a weak-kneed American 
public, a foppish Congress, and an indecisive chief executive. The blame 
for this perpetuation of the concept cannot, however be laid entirely at the 
doorstep of a myopic military leadership. For if the Army is still naively 
attempting to set the same kind of conditions for intervention that it did in 
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the decade following the Korean War, it has received (when compared with 
the effort made during the Kennedy years) little incentive to change its 
organizational bias. Indeed, it seems that the civilian leadership has 
endorsed its viewpoint rather than challenged it. 19 
The prevailing view of Vietnam as not the "big one," but one more domino, 
displayed how the military does not need to adjust to every low priority conflict. This 
mindset was blind to the combination of societal, political, and military ramifications that 
would later collide to make Vietnam a devastating psychological failure for the nation. 
Being good soldiers, the military leaders sought to satisfy the President's directives in a 
subject they did not fully understand and had assessed as a low priority in the big picture 
of national security. 
The Army Staff's reaction to the integration of the Special Warfare Division, as 
explained in the findings of the Stilwell Report, was not focused on interoperability. The 
report pointed out deficiencies in planning, the understaffed Special Warfare Division of 
DCSOPS led only by a Colonel, and "the reluctance of the other staff sections to perform 
duties which [were] properly theirs" in order to assist the Special Warfare Division. This 
was, in part, attributable to the desire of other staff elements to focus on "normal" Army 
functions. According to Stilwell, "Instead of designing the FLAG with primary emphasis 
on its utility in waging counterinsurgency, the Army staff was engaged in 'fierce intrastaff 
arguments that developed ... over the size and composition of the various blocks on the 
organizational chart. ' The emphasis was on expanding the domain of one's own branch 
rather than on structuring the FLAG to fit an overall strategy for its use. "20 
The military leadership in this case did not hold SOF and conventional force 
interoperability as a high priority. They sought to marginalize counterinsurgency 
organizations and they succeeded. However, over time and at the pace of change deemed 
19 Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr., The Army in Vietnam, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 
1986, p. 271. 
20 Ibid., p. 106. 
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acceptable to the evolution of the conventional forces, the utility of SOP was seen fit for 
survival in the eyes of at least some of the military leadership. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The Kennedy administration faced a problem similar to that faced by the Roosevelt 
administration--a military bureaucracy that did not want to change according to the civilian 
leaderships' view of the national military requirements. Kennedy wanted his perception 
of a flexible response capability instituted in the military to counter Soviet sponsored wars 
of liberation. On the other hand, the conventional military leadership viewed conflicts like 
Vietnam as a sideshow in comparison to preparations for the Soviet threat in Europe. Like 
the OSS case study, civilian leadership would not achieve a substantial degree of SOP 
interoperability with the conventional forces. This case does show the raw building blocks 
being laid for future interoperability. Small incremental gains were made in the 
sustainment of SOP structure even after Kennedy's death. The variable of his leadership 
in championing the cause of SOP was the catalyst for change. The incremental gain for 
SOP and conventional force interoperability in this case was analogous to Infantry seizing 
a foothold in a building at the edge of the town. Infantry must then consolidate and hold 
until a superior force arrives to exploit the breach. There remained enough SOP structure 
and credibility to allow Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations to 
survive until the variables of military leadership, political leadership, environment change, 
and technology change could align themselves in support of SOP and conventional force 
interoperability. Again this case supports the theory that interoperability between SOP and 
the conventional force will only work as an evolution from within the military, not as a 
revolution from above. 
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V. CASE THREE: SURVIVAL WITHOUT A POLITICAL GUARDIAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After Vietnam, the political and military consternation over counterinsurgency 
faded quickly. There where too many other military, political, and societal wounds to be 
licked. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the dominant variables of military and political 
leadership interacted in such a way as to stifle interoperability issues. This case centers 
around the selective amnesia that occurred in regard to lessons learned in Vietnam. The 
time frame of this case starts with the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1973 until 1980, 
before Operation Desert One. 
In the military, bureaucracy is a good thing; it promotes the routinization of tasks 
to allow complex organizations to flow and operate within the decision cycle of its 
opponents. However, when the organization's bureaucratic leadership ignores ground 
truth provided by junior leaders, the leaders have failed. The leaders are wrong because 
they then fail to engage in organizational corrective actions. During the Vietnam War an 
undercurrent of opinions opposed to the strategies used to prosecute the War were 
purposely filtered out. Most disturbing was the fact that the complaints came from the 
Military Advisory Group Vietnam, the very men who were executing the strategies. The 
American military's ability to be self-correcting was clouded by conventional military and 
the political leadership's desire to fight their kind of war, thus negating the military's 
ability to learn from its defeats. 
The civilian leadership's effect on interoperability, under President Kennedy, was 
of great assistance to the SOF cause. But, political sponsorship can be fickle and not very 
successful at encouraging the support of conventional military leaders. All men, including 
military officers, make their own cost benefit analysis of situations. Those officers who 
supported or served the SOF cause had to have been mindful of the fact that their 
livelihood still depended on their allegiance to the conventional bureaucracy. A 
reasonable belief of organizational survival for SOF had to exist before many would 
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attempt to cut across the grain of the conventional bureaucracy. The perception of low 
percentage of promotions given to SOF experienced officers was an indicator of the 
conventional leadership's prognosis for SOF as a viable career path and its suitability for 
increased interoperability with the conventional force. BG Peter Dawkins surveyed 509 
officers who served as advisors during January 1962 and again in September 1965 (see 
Table 3). The survey gives further evidence of conventional military disinterest in 
interoperability with SOF. To the Army's junior officers pursuing interoperability issues 
were increasingly viewed as unimportant to their careers. 
Table 3. Officer Perceptions of Advisory Duty21 
War period 
January 1962-September 1965 
October 1965-June 1967 









After John F. Kennedy's death, the military continued its prosecution of the 
conflict in Vietnam. The military leadership maintained their belief in the strategy that the 
enemy would soon fight the conventional conflict that the United States military was 
hoping for. SOF was a secondary effort that was increasingly made to conduct missions 
that supported the conventional operations, such as reconnaissance and direct actions, over 
and above their original unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency role. Operations 
that attacked the infrastructure of the insurgency, such as the Phoenix Project, were 
misunderstood and under resourced. 
The stain of Vietnam on American civilian and military institutions caused a 
regrettable lack of will to analyze the lessons learned, much like a person burned on a 
21 Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr., The Army in Vietnam, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 
1986, p. 208. 
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stove who then refuses to reexamine the stove in order to learn how to turn it off. The 
conventional military had for a time chosen to engage in revisionist type theories that did 
not challenge their paradigm of war. With the distasteful conclusion of the conflict the 
geopolitical environment was still ripe for SOF involvement around the world. However, 
the political climate that gripped both the civilian and military communities caused a self-
imposed state of selective amnesia in regard to the study of the lessons learned in Vietnam. 
The effect on SOF and conventional force interoperability at the conclusion of 
Vietnam was the widening of an emotional rift between SOF and conventional forces. 
That rift was not unlike the rift between the military and the civilian population during the 
same period in that it was based on mutual misunderstanding on the part of all parties. 
Even some officers in the SOF community wanted to forget, rather than build on the 
lessons in Vietnam. In the early 1970s most of the archives and lessons learned documents 
on Vietnam, stored at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, were 
stacked in hallways where anyone interested in these document could take them before they 
were thrown the trash. 
B. ENVIRONMENT CHANGES 
The geopolitical environment was manipulated by the assessments of both the 
military and political leaders. America had been handed a rather inconclusive military 
defeat. The civilian leaderships assessment of the environment blamed the military. The 
military leaderships assessment of the environment blamed the civilian leadership. The 
American society in general blamed both the civilian and military leadership. The desire 
of all parties involved was to sweep Vietnam under the rug, to simply let it fade from the 
national memory as was done with the Korean War. The environmental realities may have 
determined that SOF and conventional force interoperability was needed. But the 
institutional scars received by the lessons of Vietnam caused other variables like leadership 
to make the variable of environment not a dominant factor for post-Vietnam attempts at 
SOF and conventional force interoperability. 
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C. TECHNOLOGY CHANGES 
The general focus of military technology was primarily the improvement of 
lethality through firepower, mobility, and communications where it improves the ability 
to bring about a synergistic effect on the battlefield. 
The effect of technology on SOF interoperability with conventional forces saw 
limited initiatives toward interoperability in communications. For the most part SOF 
research and development floundered without adequate funding. For SOF, many of the 
producers of technologies would have to redirect research and development to a genre of 
warfare that was more social than firepower-related. There were existing technologies that 
did enhance SOF communications and mobility, such as long range radios and airframes 
capable of deep penetrations into enemy airspace. In general the effect of technology as 
an enhancer for SOF interoperability with the conventional forces was marginal at best. 
D. ORGANIZATION GROWTH 
The effect of organization growth and reduction as a variable in this case acts as 
a yardstick for the measurement of an evolutionary process interoperability between SOF 
and conventional forces in the American military. The wartime organizational growth was 
attributed to outside political leadership. However, when SOF organizational reduction 
in this instance is compared to the case of the OSS, it shows a higher tolerance toward the 
institutionalization of SOF by the dominant variable, conventional military leadership. 
SOF was reduced but not disbanded in the wake of Vietnam. To a small degree SOF had 
become institutionalized within the military, but not interoperable. During Vietnam, 
organization studies were written and excellent concepts developed that fashioned SOF into 
functional military units. To some extent, these units were formed but only as emasculated 
organizations not in keeping with the original concepts that prompted their formation. The 
leaders of these Special Forces Groups did not waste the organizational tablescraps given 
to them. The key factor that the guardian conventional military bureaucracy allowed SOF 
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to control was: quality recruiting, imbuing SOF with an organizational mindset based on 
operational creativity above a reliance on firepower, and technology. SOF organizations 
would exist at the margins of operations other than war for more than a decade. In 
missions such as Foreign Internal Defense, Humanitarian Assistance, and Strategic 
Reconnaissance, even as a method of delivery of tactical nuclear devices, SOF forces had 
to continually strive to stay relevant enough to merit organizational survival under the 
stewardship of the conventional military. 
E. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
The effect of political leadership on SOF and conventional force interoperability 
in this case was a useful, but short-lived experience. President Kennedy's political 
leadership and assessment of the miliary and political requirements set the stage for a SOF 
attempt at interoperability with conventional forces. When Kennedy passed away, so did 
SOP's protection from the existing military leadership. From that point on the realization 
of SOP's integration with the conventional force would fade. President Johnson would not 
be as much a protector of SOF as was Kennedy; however, he did not support SOFs 
abolishment either. The support of civilian leadership has short-term benefit and limited 
long-term protection from the control of military leadership. Revolution from above does 
not work in favor of SOF and conventional force interoperability--the matter of 
interoperability must be championed by military leaders. 
F. MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
As in the preceding case, the variable of military leadership was the dominant 
variable in the interoperability of SOF and conventional forces. Military leaders within 
the American military bureaucracy proved more resistant to change than the variables of 
political leadership and environment change. In the post Vietnam era the military shelved 
the concepts of counterinsurgency and SOF interoperability with it. Focusing on the 
redirection of the American paradigm for the prosecution of regional conflicts paled in 
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comparison to the cold war priorities. The military leadership reacts to change at its own 
relatively organized rate of acceptance. The military as an organization can accept 
dramatic change when the military leadership views the change as internally produced. 
The changes in military matters were externally prompted by civilian leadership. The 
changes ran counter to their paradigm of war, and military leaders resisted the change. 
Whether the military leaders are conventional force or SOF they have historically engaged 
in a bureaucratic style of defensive posture and wait on a favorable change in the political 
wind. The mindset of the military leadership did not positively influence interoperability. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The effect of the variable of environment was like the preceding cases. The 
geopolitical environment was manipulated by the assessments of both the conventional 
military and political leaders. As in the preceding case the variable of military leadership 
was the dominant variable when in the interoperability of SOF and conventional forces. 
Military leaders within the American military bureaucracy proved more resistant to change 
than the variables of political leadership and environment change. The military leadership 
reacts to change at its own relatively organized rate of acceptance. The support of civilian 
leadership has short-term benefit and limited long-term protection from military leadership 
control. Revolution from above does not work in favor of SOF and conventional force 
interoperability. The matter of interoperability must be championed by military leaders. 
The effect of organization growth as a variable in this case acts as a yardstick for the 
measurement of institutionalization of SOF, not the evolutionary process of interoperability 
between SOF and conventional forces in the American military. SOF organizational 
survival in this case compared to the case of the OSS, shows a higher tolerance toward the 
existence of SOF by the dominant conventional military leadership. In general the effect 
of technology as an enhancer for SOF interoperability with the conventional forces was 
marginal at best. 
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VI. CASE FOUR: OPERATION DESERT ONE--A NEW LEASE FOR SOF 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The creation of Special Forces as a branch of the Army in 1986 was an 
extraordinary evolutionary leap in favor of SOF and conventional force interoperability. 
The significant evolutionary change in SOF and conventional force interoperability can be 
traced to the failure of the hostage rescue mission called Operation Desert One. With all 
due respect to the professionals who fell during the ill fated operation, Desert One was the 
best thing to happen to SOF and conventional force interoperability since President 
Kennedy. The fact is, if Operation Desert One had not been such a complete political and 
military failure, SOF would not possess many of the organizational strengths it has today. 
To the existing military bureaucracy it was analogous to an organizational 
insurgency progressing from the latent phase of passive resistance to active resistance. 
SOF received a joint headquarters, a separate budget program, and was organized by law 
as a truly joint force. These very real organizational changes empowered SOF with a 
degree of strategic space to compete within the military at large for its proper niche in the 
spectrum of conflict. Prior to the failed Operation Desert One, special operations units 
existed at the discretion of their parent services. They survived on the fringes of military 
doctrine and often were not included in joint planning or contingency plans. Even though 
Operation Desert One involved primarily inextremis type forces. The corrective actions 
in its aftermath gave a new lease on I ife for both unconventional warrior types as well as 
the special mission units. As in the previous cases, the push to accept SOF and 
conventional force interoperability came from the civilian leadership. A major difference 
was that the residual effects of military failure were not transferable as it was in Vietnam. 
The military had to succumb to improving interoperability between armed services 
including SOF. 
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The United States with respect to the geopolitical and military environment was not 
defeated, just embarrassed. But, in an election year, the effect on the Carter 
administration was tantamount to losing a world war. A joint operation of immense 
political importance had failed. The effect of this failure on SOF interoperability with the 
conventional force, strangely enough would be a positive one. President Ronald Reagan 
had everything to gain by exploiting "Carter's failure." Subsequently, Reagan capitalized 
on the event by devoting resources toward a solution, to correct a problem he blamed on 
the previous administration. Hence, institutional changes to permanently promote 
interoperability in the conventional military would finally include the incorporation of 
SOF. Yet again, SOFs structure was rescued by civilian leadership. "For several years 
a small group in Congress, including senators William S. Cohen and Sam Nunn and 
congressmen Dan Daniel, Earl Hutto, and John R. Kasich, had studied the problems of 
U.S. special operations. Among their chief concerns were the fragmentation of the 
command of special operations forces and what they viewed as the services' halfhearted 
commitment to improving these forces--even though the administration viewed the 
upgrading of special operations forces as a priority. "22 The reconfiguration of SOF had 
been slow, lacking the personal support of a president such as existed with John Kennedy. 
The aftermath of Operation Desert One was an acceleration toward interoperability; 
however, this time it was less of a revolution from above and more of an evolutionary 
corrective action involving military leaders. 
Shaken by the fiasco in Iran and spurred by the Special Operation 
Review Group that investigated it, which recommended creating a 
counterterrorist joint task force with a permanent staff and forces, in 1982 
the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC) ... In 1984 the Department of Defense created an additional special 
operations body, which, according to its charter, advised the JCS in all 
matters pertaining to special operations ... Concurrently with the creation of 
22 Vanderbroucke, Lucien S., Perilous Options: Special Operations as an 
Instrument of U.S Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p. 155. 
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JSOC and JSOA, the Reagan administration embarked on a program of 
'revitalization' of U.S. special operations forces. 23 
Desert One was not a failure of technology; it was a failure in joint interoperability. 
"Lack of compatible equipment has been one source of difficulties; in the Iran 
rescue mission, many of the Air force, Marine Corps, and Army Units at Desert One did 
not have radios allowing them to talk to one another. In addition, the personnel who have 
come together to plan and execute strategic operations had difficulty understanding one 
another's standard operating procedures. "24 In one aspect the misguided application of 
military intelligence gathering technology proved to be a serious shortfall. "For most of 
the past three decades, the United States has, according to students of the U.S. Intelligence 
community, placed ·far greater emphasis on technical intelligence gathering than on 
collection by human agents. TECHINT spending has generally outstripped HUMINT 
spending by a ratio of about seven to one. "25 Rehashing the difficulties encountered in 
Operation Desert One is not the main point to be made. The important fact is that these 
and other problems related to interoperability are now being addressed and corrected over 
time. Technological innovations for SOP have recently begun to originate from SOP. 
The military's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) may not provide 
the innovative edge that SOP needs to organizationally survive the information age. 
By focusing preemptively on rigorous quantitative analysis of cost 
benefit effectiveness, PPBS subtly inhibited technological 
innovation ... advantage in the PPBS arena accrued to systems which offer 
incremental improvements of tried and true technologies whose effect could 
be predicted with reasonable accuracy. Should anyone be surprised, then, 
23 Vanderbroucke, Lucien S., Perilous Options· Special Operations as an 
Instrument of lJ S Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p. 
171. 
24 Ibid., p. 155. 
25 Ibid. 
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that an extraordinary high proportion of weapons systems procurement 
programs which yielded major advances in military capability were the 
product of 'black' programs, originated and managed outside the PPBS 
mainstream? The bureaucracies that blossomed throughout the defense 
establishment were managed by military accountants who, in addition to 
confusing efficiency with effectiveness, also inhibited imagination and 
innovation. One should not be surprised that black programs, on the other 
hand seemed to have been more successful than those which have had to 
run the entire PPBS gauntlet. 26 
SOF leadership now had a stake in the organizational game. The integration of 
SOF was not institutionalized within conventional planning at all levels, nor were SOF 
concepts integrated fully into the curriculums of conventional officer education and 
training schools. SOF leadership began making inroads for SOF integration or at least 
cooperation with the conventional force. 
Examining the Reagan administration's push to have the Army 
generate Special Operations Forces (SOF) as they are now called, gives one 
a strong sense of deja vu. This time around however, the revolution from 
above is being led without the strong presidential personal interest evinced 
by John Kennedy. Nor is there anything resembling the Special Group 
(Counterinsurgency), which, while flawed, at least provided a sense of 
high-level concern for low-intensity conflict and a mechanism for linking 
together the numerous departments and agencies that would have to work 
together in any future U.S. involvement in foreign internal defense. Today 
oversight of Army special operations is carried out by only a handful of 
civilians in the Pentagon with the verbal blessing, but not the direct 
involvement of the Secretary of Defense Weinberger. 27 
The SOF leadership pushed the SOF bureaucratic agenda, yet kept mindful of the 
fact that SOF is not the flagship, but a supporting combat arm to the conventional force. 
26 Guilmartin, John F., Jr., Technology and Strategy· What are the Limits? 
Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, 20 July 1994, p. 23. 
27 Vanderbroucke, Lucien S., Perilous Options· Special Operations as an 
Instrument of 0 S Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p. 271. 
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B. ENVIRONMENT CHANGES 
The effect of the environment as a variable on SOF and conventional force 
interoperability was dominant in this case. The environment was the catalyst that caused 
the normally dominant variable of military leadership to trash its flawed assessments of 
military requirements. Military leadership had assessed a low priority to interoperability 
issues between services and SOF and conventional force operations. The environmental 
reality of the military's inability to operate jointly was rewarded by a clear and painful 
military defeat. The continued building of military requirements founded in inaccurate 
assessments of what the military geopolitical environment was, led to the military 
propagating its own interoperability problems. 
For the first time the relationship between environment change and technology 
change would display an exponentially increasing effect of SOP and conventional force 
interoperability. As a matter of fact, the variables of environment, leadership, and 
organizational growth had begun to be pulled in the direction that information technology 
decided to take them. 
C. TECHNOLOGY CHANGES 
For the first time the variable of technology started to positively effect SOP and 
conventional force interoperability. Two important differences in technology existed in 
this case that significantly influenced the evolutionary process for SOP and conventional 
force interoperability. First, the focus of technology had transitioned from industrial 
production to information manipulation, e.g., the digitization of the battle field. The 
conventional force has increasingly tapped into technologies that bleed over into the more 
human or social concerns that SOP has typically been involved in. An example is the use 
of computers and databases for population control measures, potentially useful in 
counterinsurgency operations. Second, SOP has been endowed with it own research and 
development capabilities coupled with a SOP agenda for the development of technologies. 
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The key factor for SOF and conventional force interoperability has been the 
conventional military leadership as the sponsor of this technological focus on connectivity 
and information control that has pulled SOF into the fold as a usable product for the 
conventional force. 
D. ORGANIZATION GROWTH 
Organizational growth in SOF can prove to be a detriment to SOF and conventional 
force interoperability. For example, the Special Forces branch can barely maintain enough 
officers to keep operational slots filled. The accession rate is low due to a policy of 
admitting only high quality soldiers into the active Special Forces. To fill the operational 
slots by lowering the standards for admittance to the force could cause the force to 
become less effective. On the other hand the lack of organizational growth holds long-
term problems for Special Forces branch. For example, the present compliment of 
Special Forces colonels and lieutenant colonels is too small a pool of Army-wide 
competitive officers for the rank of general officer. Thus, the opportunity for the future 
SOF community to be led by SOF experienced general officers is not likely. 
E. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
The effect of political leadership on SOF and conventional force interoperability 
in this case was substantial. The key component was the change in the interplay between 
the military and political leadership. The combination of a military defeat and the lack of 
heavy support for SOF from President Reagan made the application of political pressure 
on the military less like a revolution from above. The military's resistance to accepting 
guidance from the political leadership in regard to military matters was reduced by the fact 
that the blame for the failed mission in Iran could not be easily transferred to the political 
leadership, the media nor the enemy. Because of this combination of the variables, 
political leadership in this case was able to break the pattern of being only a short-term 
benefit to SOF and conventional force interoperability. A marked difference in the 
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geopolitical environment contributed to an increase in the political leaderships' demands 
for political objectives over military objectives when employing the military in the 
emerging genre of operations other than war. 
F. MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
The effect of the variable of military leadership remained the dominant variable in 
whether or not SOF and conventional force interoperability can be achieved. The key in 
this case for the conventional military leadership was the failure of Operation Desert One. 
If the operation had been conducted without SOF involvement, the previous cases would 
indicate that SOFs interoperability with the conventional force would have been ignored. 
The shortfalls in interservice joint operations would have been addressed. However, SOF 
would not have been highlightf'd and targeted for corrective actions or enhancement. 
The sut::;equent ample t'·sourcing of military programs during the Reagan and Bush 
administrations assisted in lowering the resource competitive mindset between conventional 
forces and SOF. This moderate level of evolution toward SOF and conventional force 
interoperability must not give birth to arrogance within SOF. SOF must use each new 
organizational capability to engender further interoperability between SOF and 
conventional forces. The conventional force initiatives in information warfare promise a 
multitude of SOF opportunities to prove itself interoperable with the conventional forces 
without sacrificing SOFs uniqueness. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
Operation Desert One was the best thing to happen to SOF since President 
Kennedy. The fact is that if Operation Desert One had not been such a complete political 
and military failure, SOF would not exist in it present form. If the operation been 
conducted without SOF involvement, the previous cases would indicate that SOFs 
interoperability with the conventional force would have been ignored. The corrective 
actions in its aftermath gave a new lease on life for the unconventional warrior-type units 
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as well as the special mission units. As in the previous cases, the push to accept SOF and 
conventional force interoperability came from the civilian leadership. A major difference 
was that the stink of military failure was not transferable as it was in Vietnam. The 
military had to succumb to improving interoperability with SOF. The effect of civilian 
sponsorship had succeeded where it had previously failed. In this case some sustainment 
of SOF interoperability was achieved by acts of law that prevented the conventional 
bureaucracy from diverting SOF efforts at interoperability. A definite change in the 
application and the acceptance of guidance from the political leadership had occurred. 
This time it was less of a revolution from above. 
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Vll. SOF INTEROPERABILITY WITHIN THE MILITARY 
Once we had achieved our goals, bureaucracy took over. We 
became top heavy, and as an institution we forgot how to test, experiment 
and learn new ideas. We began to prefer analysis and debate to 
experimentation. It is time to remind ourselves that today's "profits" are 
traceable to wise and bold decisions made many years ago. If we are to 
profit in the future, we must continue to focus on what is to be rather than 
on what has been. 28 
Sidney Shachnow, Major General (Ret) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters III, IV, V, and VI examined four cases of the SOF evolution toward an 
optimal form of integration with the conventional force. Chapter VII will present 
conclusions on the four cases as a whole, identify the recurring dominant variables that 
helped SOF interoperability with conventional forces and also identify those variables that 
over time had a minimal effect on SOF interoperability with conventional forces. 
The recurring situation in all four cases was the forced innovation on the military 
by civilian leadership. That external pressure was met each time by a corresponding 
resistance by the conventional military leadership. In every case, there was substantial 
short-term organizational growth and a short-lived period of civilian political support. 
When civilian leadership support began to wane, the conventional military bureaucracy cut 
back SOFs organizational gains. SOFs receipt of external support from civilian leadership 
often saved the day during organizational low points. However, external support never 
made SOF a contender for adequate levels of interoperability into the military. U.S. 
Special Operations Forces can not depend upon external political leadership to ensure 
28 MG (Ret) Sidney Shachnow, Notional 'X' Command, Special Warfare Magazine, 
October 1995, p. 16-17. 
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organizational survival within the military bureaucracy. For SOF to survive, it must foster 
the support of the conventional military leadership. Environmental realities and even 
military failure, at times, did not sway the power of the U.S. military bureaucracy to 
follow its own agenda. Operation Desert One was the best thing to happen in respect to 
Special Operations Forces organizational survival. The corrective actions in the aftermath 
of Desert One provided the strategic space for Special Operations Forces to grow 
organizationally and resist being marginalized by the military's conventional bureaucracy. 
The following are conclusions drawn from the impact of the five variables on 
interoperability: 
• Environmental reality was not always the dominant variable in determining 
whether or not SOP and conventional force interoperability was important. The 
geopolitical environment was continuously subjected to differing political and 
military assessments of what the military requirements should be. 
• Technology, as a variable effecting SOF and conventional force interoperability, 
has changed more than any of the other variables effecting SOP. Until the mid-
1980s, technology played a minor role in the promotion of SOF and 
conventional force interoperability. Over time the technological focus of the 
conventional force has begun to shift from production for the enhancement of 
firepower to the manipulation of information. This change has made the 
abilities of SOF to gather information, conduct population control measures, 
and coordinate with foreign services more interoperable with the conventional 
force. 
• The variable of organizational growth has not been a good indicator of SOP and 
conventional force interoperability. At best it shows the level of tolerance by 
conventional military leaders toward SOF existence within the military. 
• The variable of political leadership has been consistently good for the short-term 
organizational survival of SOF. Political sponsorship of SOF has been 
consistently less resilient to waffling over time. The political leaders may have 
made the correct assessment of the geopolitical military requirements; but, the 
imposition of their SOP requirements on the military leadership did not endure 
over time. 
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• Military leadership was the dominant variable in the viability of SOF and 
conventional force interoperability. When pressured by the political leadership 
to enhance SOF and conventional force interoperability, the military leadership 
reacted with a bunker mentality, to wait it out until the political luster of the 
idea had faded. This had worked until the failed Iranian rescue in Operation 
Desert One. The undeniable shortcomings of the military, both SOF and 
interservice interoperability, forced the conventional military leaders to accept 
a degree of unpalatable change in favor of SOF and conventional force 
interoperability. 
B. INTEROPERABILITY IN THE PRESENT 
Much like the tumblers in a lock must be aligned, the five factors influencing 
organizational reconfiguration must be aligned in favor of SOF before it can restructure 
to engage future requirements and promote SOF's interoperability within the conventional 
military bureaucracy. Conclusions will be formed about the following: 
• Why now is the best time to engage in reconfiguration SOF. Examining what 
we think the future holds in store. 
• What SOF must do to succeed in maintaining relevance in the next century. 
The factors of environment change, technology change, organization growth, 
political leadership changes, and military leadership changes have converged like the 
tributaries of a river, providing the organizational strategic space for SOF to attempt a 
cooperative unification with its guardian bureaucracy, the conventional military. 
As stated by Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspen, the U.S. will be faced with 
four pre-eminent challenges: the challenges of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the 
threat of regional conflicts, the dangers to newly emerging democracies, and the threats 
to the global economy. The National Military Strategy of the United States envisions four 
principal means of countering these dangers and achieving our national security objectives. 
Through strategic deterrence and defense, forward stationing, and being capable of crisis 
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response, the United States prepares to achieve its national security objectives in an 
unsettled and dangerous world. 29 
Radical changes in the global geopolitical environment have sparked a frenzied 
discussion of the concept of reconfiguration throughout the military services. SOF 
leadership has the ominous tasks of structuring a force to engage emerging military 
requirements, and simultaneously chart a course that will provide organizational survival 
within the military institution. 
Currently, the military has espoused to a concept of a "Revolution in Military 
Affairs" and every service is talking of reconfiguration to varied extents. It is, however, 
a reconfiguration tainted with downsizing. 
The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent 
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we 
possess at present. If we simply prorate our reductions-cut equally across 
the board-we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies 
that are no longer likely-and less than we must have to meet new 
challenges. What we need are not merely reductions- but restructuring. 
President Bush, Aspen Institute, August 2, 1990 
Will the military take heed of President Bush's advice and not reduce a SOF force 
that has come of age, just because the conventional force must reduce? The priority 
should now shift to the forces most relevant to the environment. The United States military 
is presently experiencing culture shock over some of the recent recommendations for major 
reconfiguration. "In fact, Miller and Friesen (1984) argue that organizations typically go 
for fairly long periods of time with relatively little structural change but then experience 
intervals of major reconfiguration. Organizations try to retain their existing form as long 
29 Steven L. Arnold and Christopher Allen Yuknis, Ethnic Conflict: Force 
Structure and Training Requirements, Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, 1993, p. 
329. 
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as possible in order to maintain internal consistency and to avoid upsetting the existing 
equilibrium. But, if the environment changes while the organization remains static, the 
structure gets more and more out of touch with the environment. Eventually, the gap 
becomes so wide that the organization is forced to do a major overhaul. Reconfiguration 
in this view is like spring cleaning: We accumulate debris over months or years, and 
finally we have to face up to the mess. "30 
In the real world of competing bureaucracies, political shifts, and diminishing 
resources, there is a historical precedence for militaries to be reformers and not innovators. 
The long view of the peacetime military centers on fighting the parochial fight for turf and 
resources. 
Organization theory explains a great deal about general tendencies 
within the military organizations that affect military doctrine and grand 
strategy ... Often, militaries prefer offense, yet defensive strategies emerge. 
Militaries oppose innovation. Military organizations attempt to go their 
own way and avoid the setting of priorities. Services avoid cooperation 
with each other. In spite of such tendencies priorities get set, the military 
organizations are deflected from their preferred course. 31 
Paul Bracken recommends: 
From many years of experience in long-range planning at the 
Hudson Institute came some difficult lessons learned. The hardest single 
feature in conducting long-range planning and brainstorming sessions for 
both government and private sector clients was to divorce oneself from 
current conditions ... With the end of the cold War it is understandable that 
immediate issues would be analyzed as future signposts. In the absence of 
other guidance their is not mush else on which to base planning. But if 
anything seems certain it is that in not too many years a new equilibrium 
30 Lee G. Bolman and Terrennce E. Deal, Reframing Organizations· Artistry 
Choice and Leadership, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1991, p. 95. 
31 Barry R. Posen, The sources of Military Doctrine· France Britain and Germany 
Between the World Wars, Cornell University Press, London, 1984, p. 227. 
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in U.S. military spending will be established, the situation in Bosnia will 
be accepted, and the new dangers will loom on the nation's horizon. 32 
... --------~ 
The trends that have a profound influence on SOF are the gravitation of the military 
toward Joint and Combined Operations combined with the national leaderships' increased 
engagement of operations other than war. The criteria used in selecting these particular 
trends were: 
• These were the most often referred to in current publications concerning the 
future of military organizations. 
• Operations other than war are predicted to be the preeminent military 
requirement of the next century. 
• The trend of Joint and Combined operations represent the internal organizational 
attempt at adaptation to new environmental requirements, and constraints. 
• These trends combined present a better picture of SOF 's future configuration 
for their niche in the spectrum of conflict. 
The trends of U.S. involvement in operations other than war and Joint or 
Combined Operations should be capitalized on by SOF. I used as an outline, the five 
variables typically influencing organizational reconfiguration: environment changes, 
technology changes, organization growth, political leadership changes, and military 
leadership changes. Using this outline, I examined why SOF and conventional forces 
should integrate. 
32 Paul Bracken, Whither the RMA: Two perspectives on tomorrow's Army, 
Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, pp.l-2. 
50 
SOF must act as the testbed, not just emulate conventional force structures. As the 
organizational testbed, SOF will be positioned to present another reason for its 
organizational importance within the rubric of the American military paradigm of war. 
C. OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 
Prior to every major conflict and in its aftermath, operations other than war have 
and will always exist. Often, whether or not the military has a taste for these operations 
other than war, they will not prevent our national involvement in these operations. 
1. Environment Changes 
The Cold War notion of conflict short of war is obsolete. Politically 
and militarily, the Third World of the future will be full of danger. The 
future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed states, 
new forms of insurgency and terrorism, and 'gray area phenomena. ' Many 
if not most Third World states will fragment into smaller units. 
Ungovernability and instability will be the norm with power dispersed 
among warlords, primal militias, and well-organized politico-criminal 
organizations. U.S. Policy in the Third World is likely to be more 
selective and the U.S. homeland may no longer provide sanctuary. 
Renewed external support will restore the lagging proficiency of insurgents 
and terrorists. 33 
If this scenario of a twenty-frrst century environment is correct then SOP is already 
relevant with respect to the basic skills they possess. Since World War II, SOF type forces 
have worked the "gray area phenomena" on the margins of the spectrum of conflict. In 
the Cold War, Special Forces units were relegated to Foreign Internal Defense operations, 
Joint combined exercises for training, humanitarian assistance missions, and others. 
The Army has on average 18,000 soldiers deployed in over 1000 
operational missions in some 60 countries. This represents about a 300 
33 Steven Metz, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War, 
Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, July 25,1994, p. V. 
51 
percent increase from 1990, just prior to the Persian Gulf War. These 
soldiers are performing humanitarian operations in Somalia, Northern Iraq, 
and the Pacific; peacekeeping in Sinai, Cambodia, the western Sahara, 
Syria, and Macedonia; training exercises in Italy, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait; counterdrug and nation assistance operations in Latin America, 
Africa, and the Pacific Rim; and medical support of UN forces in Croatia. 
With little publicity and attention, America's Army executes these new 
missions as well as our traditional military-to-military relationships to 
secure our interests and mitigate conflicts in ways that no other military 
formation can. 34 
One factor not highlighted in the preceding citation was the presence of SOP in all 
of the operations mentioned. SOP personnel fulfilled many tasks, including: medical 
specialists, civil affairs coordinators, de-mining operations trainers, advisors, Direct 
Action operators, and other activities. They were the key rapport builders due to their 
cultural training. SOP have skills that are the keystone in approaching conflicts requiring 
political, cultural, and economic solutions, conflicts in which firepower or overuse of 
coercive force exacerbates the problem. 
If strategy could ever be approached as a straightforward technical 
exercise in the movement of military formations across country, war on the 
map as Jomini put it, followed by an equally straight forward, though 
considerably bloodier, exercise in fire and maneuver on the battle field, that 
time is long past. Similarly, of there was ever a time when war could be 
approached as an exercise in production line engineering, as the U.S. Army 
Air Forces did in preparation for World War II, that time is long past, as 
well. The maneuver of conventional forces and industrial production will 
remain important integers in the strategic equation, but they are no long 
preeminent. 35 
34Steven L. Arnold and Christopher Allen Yuknis, Ethnic Conflict: Force Structure 
and Training Requirements, Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, 1993, p. 1. 
35 Sir Michael Howard and John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Two Historians in Technology 
and War, Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, pp. 39-40. 
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SOF comes to the new strategic environment with a few organizational advantages: 
• Indoctrination to a new paradigm of warfare is not required, being mindful of 
the political, cultural, military implications are institutionalized in SOF. 
• The value of maturity, interpersonal skills, and cross-cultural communication 
are as much a part of their organizational mythos as their commando skills. 
• SOF does not require retraining to engage this category of operations, while the 
conventional force wrestles with how, and questioning the benefits of retraining 
and reconfiguration warfighting units for these tasks. 
The capability which SOF lacks is a structure that contains the force capabilities 
required to conduct these regionally specific operations. However, the events of Haiti, 
Somalia, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Sierra Leone, and soon Bosnia Herzegovina 
makes SOF utility clear. What it does require is the structure empowered with the key 
components used in operations other than war. 
2. Technology Changes 
Martin van Creveld suggests that technology plays an increasingly chaotic influence 
on trends. "Given the sheer number of the points of contact between technology and war, 
it is exceedingly difficult to discern long-term trends," especially because the nature of 
technology and its relationship to war "are connected, interacting, and interchangeable." 
In addition "the interaction of technology and war at any given time has been as much the 
product of arbitrary and the accidental as it was of the inevitable and the necessary. "36 
Accepting the above assumption leads to the recommendation that SOF should stay 
abreast of the last technology surge, such as information warfare, but not to bank on a 
technology for organizational survival. SOF needs to stay with timeless strengths, such 
36 Michael J. Mazarr, The Revolution in Military Affairs· A Framework for 
Defense Planning, Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, June 10, 1994, p. 7. 
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as, high quality personnel possessing maturity, cross-cultural skills, and precision oriented 
warfighting skills that are not as susceptible to technological change. "Emerging 
technology may improve the application of force in conflict short of war, but there is 
probably no imminent RMA in this arena. The changes in conflict short of war will be 
considerably less dramatic than in those projected for mid- to high-intensity combat, 
particularly when possible constraints or countermeasures are considered. "37 
Technological innovations are only useful for as long as it takes your enemies to match it 
or develop an inexpensive countermeasure. "Because U.S. engagement in conflict short 
of war will continue to have weak domestic support, opponents will not have to match us 
innovation for innovation, but only increase the cost of American engagement beyond the 
low limits of public and congressional tolerance. "38 
3. Organization Growth 
A guiding principle is the evolution and empowerment of the SOF organizations 
within Joint operations and operations other than war. Growth in the number of personnel 
and headquarters is not the objective. The objective is the strategic positioning of SOF 
within their regions of orientation under a flatter command structure suited to CINCs 
geographic warfighting requirements. Organizational growth and decline in the 
conventional force or SOF has previously been of little benefit toward interoperability. 
SOF could potentially grow in size and still not enhance its interoperability with the 
conventional force efforts. Given the high probability that conventional forces will 
continue to be drawn into operations other than war, to separate and not be interoperable 
with SOF would be a waste of limited resources. 
37 Steven Metz, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War, 
Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, July 25,1994, p. 12. 
38 Ibid., p. 13. 
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4. Political Leadership 
Now is the time for SOF to restructure. As in politics, timing is everything when 
attempting organizational change. The combination of the following sets the stage for 
interoperability with the conventional force: flux in the global economy, military 
downsizing, and changing regional balances of power, push the military to selling itself 
on the idea of changing with the environment. SOF as a branch is in its infancy. But now 
it possesses a stake in the game and a bureaucratic agenda with some strategic space 
provided by the Nunn-Cohen amendments. 
5. Military Leadership 
The most poignant variable for SOF leadership wiii be that unless SOF can change 
the existing bureaucratic rules by which its officers are managed, SOF will never grow its 
own General Officers to lead Special Operations Forces. The self inflicted wound of low 
accessions and retention of junior officers is unavoidable due to the pursuit of maintaining 
high quality officers to fill operational slots. Some gains have been achieved in the 
percentage of SOF officer promotions. These gains do not balance the existing long range 
detriment caused by an insufficient pool of competitive SOF officers to vie for general 
officer ranks. SOF may well have to suffer the fate of suppression from its own future 
general officers who were indoctrinated to conduct warfare with a strictly conventional 
paradigm of warfare. 
D. JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS 
1. Environment Changes 
For the foreseeable future, the U.S. must retain its unequaled 
military capability to fight and win wars decisively and to deter nuclear 
attack. Moreover, we cannot relinquish our capacity to act unilaterally 
with decisive military force. However, unilateral military force, even when 
applied by a superpower such as the U.S. is insufficient to address the 
cumulative effect of numerous regional, ethnic, and civil wars accompanied 
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by countless refugees, mass starvation, disease, the breakdown of civil 
order, and anarchy. 39 
Barry McCaffrey, Lieutenant General 
Two points that can be extrapolated from the above citation are: first, that the best 
organizational method geared to maintaining a unilateral capability is the further 
integration of Joint Operations within the military system; second, that combined 
operations will become commonplace in addressing regional problems. Coalitions with 
strange bedfellows such as the Syria and U.S. cooperation during Operation Desert Storm 
will continue, especially at a time in which defense planning in general and Alliance 
commitments in particular are attracting diminished support from publics which perceive 
no direct "threats" to their national or regional security interests. In many cases these 
publics seek to pay for domestic social programs--from unification costs in Germany to 
health care reform in the United States--out of what they widely perceive as "excess" 
defense funds. As a result, this is universally viewed as a good thing or even as a 
"necessary evil." Moreover, decades of old fights over "burden-sharing," combined with 
recent economic disputes ranging from Maastricht's effect on U.S. industry to trade 
disputes with Japan, have a negative effect on the American public view of our traditional 
security relationships with our traditional allies. 40 
Such a trend calls for the U.S. military to quickly form ad hoc coalition support 
teams, or units possessing the capability to ensure unity of effort and connectivity across 
potentially wide cultural and technological gaps between us and our potential coalition 
39 Barry McCaffrey, Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations, Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1993, Monograph, p. 246. 
40 Jacquelyn K. Davis, Refocusing Traditional Alliances and Esta.blishing New 
~'Strategic Studies Institute, Monograph, 1993, p. 202. 
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partners. SOF coalition support teams (CST) have championed this field of endeavor, in 
Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia, and other combined operations. 
The following lessons learned recommendations recorded by the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL) depict an environment that demands SOF's integration into the 
joint and combined operations. These recommendations are from three operations other 
than war: (1) Operation Just Cause, a predominantly unilateral military undertaking; (2) 
the combined deployment of United Nations, NGOs, and US military; and (3) Operation 
Uphold Democracy, in Haiti, SOF shows its mental flexibility and flare for being 
innovative. 41 The new joint and combined operations environment has fostered more 
opportunities for SOF and conventional force integration. Even the conventional force 
lessons learned publications repeatedly cite the complimentary effect of SOF when 
combined with conventional operations. 
• Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned42 
1. Following initial combat operations, the language capabilities and regional 
expertise of SF, civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) 
units were critical to stability operations. 
2. Intelligence sharing between SOF and the conventional forces is absolutely 
critical. 
3. SOF units often formed the nucleus of the operational element which was 
reinforced with conventional Infantry acting in direct support or on stand-by as 
a quick reaction force. 
4. SF A Detachments formed liaison teams to interface between conventional 
force area commanders and the local civilian government and police officials. 
5. SF conducted preliminary medical and engineer assessments and surveys for 
use in establishing the baseline CMO plan. 
41 Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned, Center for Army Lessons Learned 
Volume II, CAC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1990, p. 11-4. 
42 Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned, Center for Army Lessons Learned 
Volume II, CAC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1990, p. 11-4. 
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• Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II Somalia Lessons Learned43 
1. CINC consider the capability of SF as a HUMINT collection asset early in the 
strategic planning cycle, prior to a decision to commit conventional forces in 
a humanitarian relief role. 
2. SOCCE should deploy with the supported unit; consider attaching it to the 
supported unit. 
3. Strategic planners recognize and plan the use of CA assets to facilitate the 
development of theater-level themes, command relationships, missions, and 
priorities-- and then publish CA initiatives in the OPLAN/OPORD. 
4. Planners anticipate employment of PSYOPS organizations during Humanitarian 
Assistance mission planning. PSYOPS teams operation, including post-testing. 
5. Include the application of PSYOPS and Special Operations in Peace Operations 
into U.S. doctrine. 
6. In these cases, give careful consideration as to how SOF will be integrated in 
the overall theater effort. 
7. Include a SOF planning element in any U.S.-sponsored theater headquarters or 
JTF. 
8. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, must address separately and collectively the 
unique and essential aspects of civil affairs, PSYOPS, intelligence, and 
counterintelligence. Efforts must be coordinated at the highest headquarters to 
support the campaign plan. 
• Operation Uphold Democracy Haiti Lessons Learned44 
1. The SFODA commanders are breaking ground in operations other than war 
that could easily become a part of conventional operations in the future. The 
43 Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, 3 Dec 1992 - 4 May 1993, 
Operations Other Than War, Center for Army Lessons Learned, CAC, Fort 
Leavenworth Kansas, CH. IX-1. 
44 Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions Volume II, December 1994, 
Operations other Than War, Center for Army Lessons Learned. 
58 
lessons and work-arounds that the ODAs have employed when dealing with 
NGOs and PVOs, USAID and IOMs are applicable to all forces and present 
an area that is grey and not clearly defined. 
2. Based on lessons learned from operation "Desert Shield/Storm," Major 
General Byron (USA COM) directed the formulation of three CSTs to assist the 
newly forming coalition forces to "lash-up" with American forces. 
3. Consider forming Mobile Coordination Teams (MCTs) to act as liaison 
between SFODAs and governmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, and private volunteer organizations with funds for civil 
projects. 
2. Technology Changes 
The application of new technologies in the arena of operations other than war will 
assist our joint forces in their ability to achieve a greater degree of connectivity in 
communications and procedures. Due to better communications technology, combined 
operations with allies will be afforded more opportunities to ensure reliable coordination. 
The business of cross-cultural relations will always be a low technology messy job. Unless 
the gaining of rapport between allied forces can be obtained through a new technology, 
SOF will need to maintain its Desert Shield example of basic cross-cultural and 
interpersonal skills. 
3. Organization Growth 
A feasible best scenario for SOF would be one of relatively little growth. 
Considering the present downsizing of the military, no decrease of SOF force structure is 
a mark of organizational success. But, meeting the national military requirements and 
organizational growth in terms of size is not important. The reconfiguration of SOF units 
to have the capabilities that joint or combined operations need, is the organizational growth 
that will be important. 
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4. Political Leadership 
The reliance on external civilian political support for SOF will not ensure the 
interoperability of SOF with the conventional force. However, it is a bonus for SOF that 
the geopolitical environment in the 1990s continues to lean in SOFs favor as the politicians 
force of choice for regional military problems. The politically low profile operational 
style of SOF type forces has engendered the continued support of the political leadership. 
The ability to project force in a non-coercive manner has held great political leverage in 
the application of United States foreign policy. The recent shift of political leadership 
away from imposing SOP-related changes on the conventional military leadership to the 
application of interoperability by military leadership at the military's pace, is a hopeful 
sign for SOF and conventional force interoperability. 
5. Military Leadership 
A slow change in attitude in favor of SOF has begun within some of the 
conventional military. This favorable trend must be encouraged, but it must emphasize 
SOF's ability to compliment conventional forces, not emulate them. The JFK Special 
Warfare Center continues to ensure the inclusion of SOF in new doctrinal publications 
wherever possible. The intellectual literature on military affairs continually raises the 
priority of SOF participation in joint and especially combined operations with allies. In 
his book, The United States Army in Transition, 1973, LTC Fredric J. Brown wrote: 
"Certainly our Special Forces personnel performed magnificently in Vietnam, but their 
example merely illustrates the point that a great deal of time and effort are needed to 
produce a competent guerilla leader. And it is of course true that while the indigenous 
efforts were important, they were decidedly subsidiary to the overall main force effort. "45 
His current book, The lJ S Army in Transition II, 1993, shows a marked difference in 
his perception of SOFs role: 
45 Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. and Fredric J. Brown, The United States Army in 
Transition, Sage Publications, Severely Hills/London, 1973, p. 65. 
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It may be useful to create regional institutes at Fort Leavenworth 
tied to regional Special Operations Forces (SOF) Groups, to provide area 
expertise. Regional Institutes could also assess, as an element of 
contingency planning, national military comparative ability of potential 
allies by battlefield functions. In a multinational force, national 
contributions would take advantage of national military strengths. For, 
example, the United States clearly has dominant intelligence capabilities, 
and the U.S. contribution would exploit this fact. Then, if the planning 
results in an actual contingency operation, SOF could facilitate the 
introduction of BOS into the particular region. This could be quite similar 
to SOF training responsibilities with allies in Operation Desert Shield. The 
issue is not regional alignment, as during the Cold War, but the 
development of local military associations in step with political, economic, 
and social realities of the information age as they evolve with these 
places ... The global 'victory' of democracy underscores the importance of 
the Army's (particularly SOF's) role in encouraging competence and 
developing equal opportunity. Because forward-presence operations seem 
to offer great peacetime opportunities, an institutional structure would be 
needed to focus these efforts. 46 
The progress in changing the mindset of the military leadership is slow. But the 
fact that many military leaders are talking of adjusting the forces to the environment, the 
information age, and that SOF should have a definitive role in combined and joint 
operations is a hopeful sign. However, when it comes to the nuts and bolts of who will 
pay for jointness, or who will not get the resources, bureaucratic parochialism will raise 
its head. There is of course considerable political clout to be relinquished or gained by a 
services' participation or abstinence from Joint Operations. 
SOF leaders have a relatively good understanding of what SOF does operationally 
and generally understand what the conventional forces are taught to do. The problem for 
SOF leadership in a joint or combined operation it that conventional forces do not 
understand the full capacity of SOF to assist the conventional force. The cornerstone of 
46 LTG Fredric J. Brown, Ph.D., USA (Ret.), TheUS Army in Transition II: 
La.ndpower in the Information Age, Brassey's (US), Inc., Washington, New York, 
London, 1993, p. 35. 
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the solution to the problem is education; specifically the interoperability of joint operations 
education with SOF, the conventional force, and allied forces. Conventional leader 
development schools must integrate more hours into their curriculums focusing on SOF 
integration. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The present United States military operational environment does not require the 
application of mid- or high-intensity warfare. Today's mix of low-intensity conflicts and 
emerging mission that fall short of war, make the use of set piece warfighting units not an 
efficient use of available resources. 
SOF being endowed with the basic cultural and interpersonal skills required for the 
spectrum of operations other than war can easily transition to engage these threats. As a 
byproduct, immersion in their respective regions has value in the field of human 
intelligence HUMINT, and enhances SOF ability to perform warfighting requirements in 
their respective regions. Conversely, this supports the sustainment of conventional force 
warfighting skills by allowing large units to stay out of long-duration operations other than 
war. 
The environment of the 1990s is full of operations that give evidence of SOFs 
usefulness in regional conflicts of a wide variety. Operations other than war will be a 
factor no matter what type of conflict emerges in the early twenty-first century. 
The military's mindset in regard to Joint and Combined Operations is becoming 
receptive to change. SOF should lead the way in developing command and control 
systems that exploit its inherent abilities to increase the rapport between services and allies. 
The conventional military leadership at the CINC level has become more likely to 
request SOF capabilities in their respective regions than ever before. 
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Vlll. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOF INTEROPERABILITY 
WITH THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY 
The following recommendations are for SOF leaders contemplating reconfiguration. 
These recommendations are derived from the previous chapters examination of the process 
of SOF organizational development and interoperability efforts under the rubric of the 
conventional military. 
• SOF must recognize the organizational tendencies of the military bureaucracy 
to resist change. With this recognition SOF must emulate appropriate 
conventional staff and coordination functions. The purpose being to create a 
level of connectivity that is "comfortable" and effective for both SOF and 
conventional forces. This does not mean that SOF will emulate conventional 
forces at an operational level. SOF must not be interpreted as being 
interchangeable with the conventional forces. 
• SOF should continue to pursue close relationships with civilian leadership. 
Though, their assistance does not always have a lasting effect on SOF 
integration with the conventional force, external political support has been a 
pivotal organizational shot in the arm on several occasions. A Special 
Operations Panel or Subcommittee in each Armed Services Committee could 
provide useful forums for such purposes and simultaneously facilitate 
congressional oversight. However, the garnering of political support that goes 
against the grain of the general purpose force leadership can potentially alienate 
SOF issues. 
• SOF should become the testbed for joint operations. USSOCOM is currently 
conducting Force XXI experiments in the 7th Special Forces Group in which 
PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, and Military Intelligence Units are organic to the 
Group. SOF due to its lack institutional strength, must innovate in more ways 
than just tactically to survive within the military. Acting as the organizational 
testbed for future military organizations is one avenue for vying for relevance 
in the coming century. SOFas it exists today is truly a joint organization, but, 
it should now evolve to a new level of jointness at the operational level of the 
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organization. The next step may be the formation of combined services SOF 
units. 
• SOF units need to be forward based to ensure regional expertise through 
multiple low cost deployments into their regions. As a byproduct, immersion 
in their respective regions has value in the field of human intelligence 
HUMINT, and enhances SOF ability to perform warfighting requirements in 
their respective regions. SOF being endowed with the basic cultural and 
interpersonal skills required for the spectrum of operations other than war can 
easily transition to engage these threats. 
• The present priorities United States military operational environment does not 
require the application of mid or high intensity warfare. Today's mix of low 
intensity conflicts and a broad spectrum of emerging mission that falls short of 
war, make the use of set piece warfighting units not an efficient use of available 
resources. In operations other than war SOF supports the sustainment of 
conventional force warfighting skills by allowing large units to stay out of long 
duration operations other than war. While SOF stays for the duration, or 
prepares to handoff the mission to some other agencies or coalitions. 
• CINCSOC, his component commanders, regionally oriented CINCs, theater 
SOC Commanders, and their staffs all believe an undesirable imbalance exists 
between Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) Civil Affairs and PSYOP 
forces. Continued reliance on RC volunteers might be budgetarily advantageous 
but has practical drawbacks. Active duty personnel risk burnout, possibly 
followed by mission failure. Alter the AC/RC mix in favor of active duty 
forces; or authorize the National Command Authorities to active reserve civil 
Affairs units that total up to 25,000 personnel, as the outgoing CINCSOC 
recently recommended in his End of Tour Report (Annex A); establish an 
Individual Ready Reserve for Civil Affairs and PSYOP. 47 
47 Collins, John M., Special Operations Forces: An Assessment 1986-1993, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540-7000, 
July 1993. 
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• Information Warfare promises many interesting capabilities that possess amazing 
potential for SOF. Unfortunately, the field is still in its infancy and not fully 
understood by all. SOF should actively engage this evolving capability with 
caution. SOF can not afford to become enthralled with interesting shiny objects 
that do not directly enhance SOF mission capabilities, yet, devour its budget. 
The manipulation of information between the SOF and the conventional force 
is the key to interoperability. SOF can not fall behind in those area of 
information warfare that will bind it closer to the operations of the conventional 
force. The future Information Warfare environment can not be ignored, but, 
participation in it will be analogous to riding a tidal wave, SOF may have to 
keep up or be made not relevant in the coming century. 
• Personnel management rules at the Department of Defense must change to assist 
SOF. SOFs pursuit of quality personnel hinders its ability to compete in the 
current bureaucracy. For example, Army Special Forces have low levels of 
accessions of junior officers. Making the special forces branch hard pressed to 
compete with other branches of the Army when trying to fill key higher staff 
positions with Special Forces officers. Officers with little or no special 
operations experience continue to occupy key command and staff positions 
within USSOCOM Headquarters and AFSOC. CINCSOC could refuse to 
accept unqualified designers, instruct his component commanders to do 
likewise, and inform the Secretary of Defense if results remain unsatisfactory. 
Also, the Special Forces pool of Lieutenant Colonels is too small to be 
competitive for future general officer boards. The Army Lieutenant General 
who commands USASOC occupies the only three-star billet within the U.S. 
special operations community. Navy and Air Force flag officers, whose 
opportunities for promotion therein terminate at two stars, can aspire to 
assignment as CINCSOC only if parent Services put them into a three-star 
conventional space. That never happens in the Navy and seldom in USAF. The 
two SEALs who enjoy flag rank never can serve on the Joint Staff or command 
a theater SOC, because they always must fill two SEAL slots within 
USSOCOM. Legislation that authorized a three-star Deputy CINCSOC and 
permanently allocated one star to every theater SOC would enhance the 
professional development of SOF flag officers and expand the pool of 
candidates who are well qualified to become CINCSOC. 48 
48 Ibid. 
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The evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps contains a lessons learned in how to 
survive organizationally within the military. SOF leaders should study the evolution of 
the Marine Corps to understand both the positive aspects and the pitfalls when competing 
for organizational survival in the U.S. military. 
Since the 1800s the Marines have acted as a suitable force for the prosecution of 
"small wars" around the world. They might have developed into our premier force for 
operations other than war. However, they, like SOF, have faced extinction at the hands 
of their parent bureaucracies in the military over the last 150 years or so. 
The Marine Corps chose to emulate the conventional forces, they emphasized their 
similarities, as we should. The Marines cultivated outside political support as we should 
do as well. They integrated themselves into joint service staff positions, as we need to do. 
The negative aspect of their example may be that they have lost certain aspects of their 
unconventional doctrine for regional operations. They made themselves fit the 
conventional mold, as we should not do. SOF needs to be connected to, but not become 
the conventional force. 
The yoke of successful interoperability between SOF and the conventional force 
will vest on the shoulders of both SOF and conventional force military leaders. SOF must 
successfully continue to sell itself as an indispensable part of the combined arms team. 
Conventional leaders must voluntarily see profit in retaining and integrating SOF 




A. AN OPINION ON RECONFIGURA TION SOF FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
The recommendations presented were based on the original concepts conceived in 
the flexible response planning of the 1960s. Concepts such as the Free World Liaison and 
Assistance Group (FLAG) mutated into an emasculated form known as a Special Action 
Force (SAF) in 1964. The organizational concepts of the FLAG, the SAF, joint 
interservice operations, and the evolving rubric of Information Warfare can be combined 
into a synergistic effect against a wide spectrum of contingencies. These organizations 
support Special Operations Forces in the Engagement of Operations other than war and 
other emerging missions of the twenty-first century. The following model is a 
recommendation for SOF reconfiguration as a whole. Recommendations for 
reconfiguration of the Regional Force are more specific. This is in contrast to the large 
grained reconfiguration of the National Force. The emphasis on the regional (white-side 
SOF) is due to the lack of unclassified data on SMU organizational structure, and the fact 
that most operations other than war may not require the SMUs. There will be some degree 
of mission overlap between the Regional and National Force in the area of operations other 
than war and joint and combined operations. However, the lions share of engagement of 
regional operations will be handled by the regional SOF Force. For this reason most of 
the recommendations will focus on the Regional Force. 
Every theater special operations command currently depends 
extensively on reserve component augmentation packets for major exercises 
and emergencies. All SOCs are waiting for USSOCOM to complete the 
formation of two Battle Staffs (one primary, one alternate) that could 
reinforce SOC headquarters faster and more effectively. Both staffs 
presently are manned but lack essential weapons. Intensified efforts by 
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CINCSOC to outfit Battle Staffs at the earliest possible date would ease the 
anxieties of SOC Commanders and garner good will for USSOCOM.49 
The organizational characteristics sought by this form of reconfiguration are: a 
divisional form of SOF structure empowering the geographic warfighting CINCs with joint 
SOF capability as forward based and tailored to their regional requirements (refer to 
Figure 1). The empowerment of "Super SOCs" can be accomplished by the recreation of 
Joint Special Action Forces (JSAF), the integration of Information Warfare Squadrons, 
Lessons Learned Teams, and the Special Operations MEUSOC. Within the organization 
a dichotomy will exist between units designated as part of the permanent core and those 
units established as the temporary project teams (refer to Figure 2). A force that by 
continuous exposure to their war time regions of responsibility, uses operations other than 
war as the vehicle to gain both the peacetime national objectives and gather intelligence 
in preparation for future conflicts. These Super SOCs and JSAFs will evolve into a force 
that obtains the maximum operational leverage out of joint operations, while each specialist 
within SOF retains his unique esprit de corps and unit mythos. Hence, whether a member 
is Special Forces, SEAL, or PSYOPS they conduct missions appropriate to their respective 
lineage. 
Henry Mintzberg, 1983, developed a set of pictures by which to represent the basic 
components of an organization. This contingency framework, in which the politics of 
organizations are pervasive, has been adjusted to represent a model of SOF organization 
in 2010 (See Figure 3). Figure 1 depicts a SOF structure in which higher headquarters, 
the permanent core, in a divisionalized form exists to sustain and control an adhocracy at 
the operational level, Figure 2. 
49 Collins, John M., Special Operators Forces: An Assessment 1986-1993, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540-7000, 
















Figure 3. Special Operations Forces 2010 
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"In this organizational form, the bulk of work is done in quasi-autonomous 
units ... " or Special Operations Commands (SOC). The structures of the SOCs themselves 
may represent any of the other possible configurations. The SOCs serve specific 
geographical warfighting CINCs and house their own functional units. The strategic apex, 
USSOCOM, strikes a deal with each SOC. The SOCs get considerable autonomy, but 
they are responsible for achieving certain measurable results: operational success, 
politically acceptable, and adherence to SOF imperatives. The operational commanders 
of the Joint Special Action Force, although subordinate to the SOC commander, are given 
wide latitude as long as they deliver results. USSOCOM and major subordinate commands 
usually give SOCs and JSAFs relatively free rein as long as they perform at preset levels. 
Headquarters manages the strategic portfolio and allocates resources based on its 
assessment of the appropriate mix for each region based on CINCs assessment of regional 
requirements for the respective geographic warfighting. 50 
The empowerment of "Super SOCs" will be accomplished by the re-creation of 
Joint Special Action Forces (JSAF), and the integration of Information Warfare 
Squadrons, Lessons Learned Teams, and the Special Operations MEUSOC. Most of the 
force reconfiguration recommendations made concern the regional SOF force, since they 
bear the brunt of the operations other than war. 
B. SUPER SOCs 
A Super SOC is an empowered regional SOC. The five regional warfighting 
CINCs each possesses a Special Operations Command. They are traditionally 
understaffed, and commanded by one (0-7) flag officer. The command from an 
organizational perspective, is strategically positioned to serve the five regional warfighting 
CINCs requirements. I propose empowering the SOC with the following: the SOC 
Commander will be a Major General, preferably with special operations experience. 
50 Lee G. Holman and Terrennce E. Deal, Reframing Organizations· Artistry 
Choice and Leadership, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1991, p. 89. 
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However, given the realities of a limited SOF officer pool of potential general officers, 
it may be difficult to expect a SOF experienced general officer to fill this position. 
The staff and support personnel of selected CONUS headquarters will be dispersed 
to beef up the five SOCs. For example, Special Forces Command and selected parts of 
all the services and Major Subordinate Commands under USSOCOM will contribute to 
building "Super SOCs." The regional SOC will be part of the organizational Permanent 
Core. It will service all staff and command functions required by the conventional CINC 
to create a stable bureaucratic connectivity with the CINCs conventional staff. The SOC 
must shield the JSAF from unnecessary downward flow of bureaucratic operational 
requirements that the JSAF will not be staffed to support. 
C. JOINT SPECIAL ACTION FORCE (JSAF) 
The recreation of the Joint Special Action Force is based on an Army organization 
designed to engage operations such as insurgencies or other operations that presently fall 
under the title of Operations Other Than War. 
I take the concept of a SAF a step further and make it an Interservice Joint Special 
Action Force. USSOCOM is already a joint organization. The formation of JSAFs 
would only be the next evolutionary step, rather than a revolutionary organizational 
testbed. 
The Joint Special Action Force will be commanded by a SOF (0-7) general officer. 
His staff and support services will be staffed by SOF personnel from all services. Each 
JSAF under the direction of their respective SOC will organize and train specifically to 
their CINC's region and the requirements as specified by the CINC. The JSAF must be 
forward based for maximum immersion with host nation militaries and to facilitate 
(HUMINT) ground truth assessments. The JSAF will exist as an adhocracy in which 
there will be few rules guiding structure and procedures on how it employs it assets. (Refer 
to Figure 2). The organization is best perceived as a collection of temporary project 
teams. 
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A project team might be comprised of a Group headquarters, two Special Forces 
Battalions, one engineer battalion, three SEAL platoons, Civil Affairs, and a medical 
company. It can also be part of a Joint Task Force with an Infantry brigade on an 
operation that might last a day or as long as two years. On the other hand, a project team 
might be one Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha and an Engineer Section. 
Duration of the mission and size of the elements will not be of high priority. The only 
organizational structures whose integrity must be respected are the Special Forces 
Operational Detachment Alpha, the SEAL platoon, and the Ranger Company. The 
operational cornerstone of the JSAF will be a Special Forces Group Headquarters. It will 
act as the operational hub for coordination, command and control all temporary project 
teams. It will accomplish this Herculean task with technological upgrades in 
communications, buttressed by high quality personnel at the operator level that hold a clear 
understanding of the commander's intent, both operational and strategic. Of note will be 
the integration of Information Warfare Squadrons, Lessons Learned Teams, and the 
Special Operations MEUSOC. 
Unit sizes dedicated to each JSAF will vary with CINCs and USSOCOMs 
warfighting requirements. The standard JSAF would be comprised of the following, 
minimum capabilities: 
1. Special Boat Unit. 
2. SEAL platoons. 
3. Army Aviation. 
4. AFSOC Aviation. 
5. JSAF Special Staff to include, Lessons Learned Teams. 
6. Special Forces Group Headquarters. 
7. Rangers. 
8. Information Warfare Squadron (IWS). 
9. Military Intelligence. 
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10. Psychological Operations. 
11. Public Affairs\Media Affairs 
12. Rotary wing Aviation Section. 
13. Special Forces Battalions. 
14. Support Battalion. 
-Signal. 
-Medical. 
- Military Police. 
15. Civil Affairs. 
16. Engineers. 
D. LESSONS LEARNED TEAMS 
The mission of these teams is the maintenance of a central database accessible by 
all SOP organizations who are "on-line" in the information net. Within the JSAF special 
staff sections will be multiple Lessons Learned Teams (LLTs). An LLT may be only one 
person with a computer. LLTs will accompany all project teams for the duration of the 
mission. They will not be operators or planners. Their function is to record all pertinent 
lessons learned and after action reports. They will record the information that operators 
do not record. Most operators become engrossed in operational matters, consequentially 
the most innovative techniques may be lost after the mission becomes a fuzzy memory. 
The database the LLTs build will be a living database. For example: A project 
team on short notice must commence operations in a country. Two days prior a separate 
project team had completed an unrelated operation in the same area. The new project team 
LLT can access the other teams after action report submitted to the database that same day. 
The report will give the new operators almost real time tips and techniques pertinent to 
their Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). The report will contain information such as 
how to gain rapport with indigenous peoples, which names to drop into conversations, 
topics to avoid discussing, and so forth. 
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E. INFORMATION WARFARE SQUADRON (IWS) 
Information Warfare Squadron promises to be an invasive factor on the 
development of all future organizations. It promises to increase an organization's decision 
cycle through the proper utilization of enhancements, such as, Digitization of the 
battlefield. Perhaps the use of information warfare systems that aid in population control 
measures, or track economic and social trends will be of some benefit in operations other 
than war. At present much of Information warfare seems to be directed at supporting the 
old paradigm of increasing lethality; whereas, SOF often requires techniques that 
manipulate the target audience as in psychological operations. 
To inject this possibly formidable capability into the Joint Special Action Force, 
structure could evolve as follows: the Information Warfare Squadron will become the 
headquarters and consolidator of all Military intelligence, Psychological operations, and 
Public Affairs/Media Affairs operations, refer to Figure 3. The assumptions, campaign 
plans, products to be implement in operations, from these three units can be cross checked 
and meshed with each other for a synergistic effect. In no way should this organization 
inhibit the flow of intelligence to the operational project teams. The IW squadron will 
have the dual requirement of satisfying the standard intelligence requirements and keeping 
pace with an information battle that may travel at the speed of light. 
The Psychological Operations Unit will gauge the impact of information warfare 
on the target populations. It will also conduct control, or damage control, of the 
information released to open media sources and military families. 
The Public Affairs element will submit timely interviews and updates to the press. 
Their objective will be to stay ahead of the press reporter's timeline requirements for 
news reports and to provide as much information to somewhat influence their reporting in 
a way that is in line with the overarching Psychological and Information Warfare 
Campaign. This will not always work, but neither does "no comment" and "we have no 
further information on that matter at this time." These statements simply motivate the 
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press to make their own uninformed interpretations or satellite-linked investigations. 
Public Affairs will assist Operational Project teams with media campaign portfolios that 
advise operators what to talk to reporters about. Today, the act of a special operator 
refusing to speak to a reporter can do more damage than giving them information. The 
Public Affair unit will also control the morale of stateside service members' families by 
keeping them informed and providing advise to family members when faced with the news 
media. 
F. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE 
(MEUSOC) 
The Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable is a valuable asset that 
has not been used to its fullest capability. By incorporating the MEUSOC into the 
operations of the SOP National Force, a more timely and efficient application of force can 
be applied during certain Special Operations. The Special Operations Capable MEU 
(MEU [SOC]) concept emerged in 1985. The intent of the concept was not to compete 
with or replace "Special Operations Forces" but to field a more capable forward deployed 
MEU. The unit contains a reinforced infantry battalion for its ground combat element, 
a composite helicopter squadron for its aviation combat element, a combat service support 
group, and a command element commanded by a Colonel (0-6). The MEU(SOC)s 
greatest advantage is its responsiveness and limited forcible entry capability. Although the 
actual size of a MEU (SOC) is largely determined by the number and type of amphibious 
ships available, the average size is about 2,200 Marines and Sailors (Medical Personnel). 
MEU(SOC)s are trained to execute 24 missions to include Non-Combatant Evacuations 
(NEO), Humanitarian Assistance, Amphibious Raids, In-Extremis Hostage Rescue (IHR), 
and Airfield Seizures. 51 The Navy will typically deploy a MEU (SOC) to regions in which 
the application of force is likely to occur. 
51 Anthony E. Van Dyke, MEU(SOC)s and the CINC's, Naval War College, 
Unpublished Paper, 22 February 1993, p. 3. 
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Presently there is "no early interface between the CINC and the 
MEU(SOC) ... Thus, the MEU(SOC) enters the theater with few remaining opportunities 
for additional training in specific areas identified in briefings "52 with the CINCs. There 
exists a need to plug in the MEU(SOC)'s capabilities with a Special Operations Force that 
has current intelligence and good connectivity with the CINCs. "Operation Eastern Exit 
brought to light certain deficiencies that existed in the Somalian NEO. Embassy location, 
lack of secure communications links and an outdated NEO package were some of the 
deficiencies. It is likely that similar deficiencies exist in other countries as well. "53 Since 
MEU(SOC), a special operations capable unit, is on the scene already it should be ready 
to mesh with elements of the SOF National and Regional Forces, who already possess the 
necessary intelligence data. An example: A MEU (SOC) located off shore of a nation 
requiring the evacuation of U.S. nationals is also tasked with a Personnel Recovery 
Mission of high political importance. A Special Mission Unit (SMU) of the National 
Force should be able, on short notice, to land on a MEU (SOC) vessel. The Marine and 
SOF Command and Control apparatus should mesh before the SMU conducts it recovery 
operation. The Marines, already rehearsed, are prepared to conduct the external security 
operations (along with a small National Force Ranger contingent), in support of the 
operation. 
52 Ibid., p. 13. 
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